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ABSTRACT
Novel Applications of Statistical and Machine Learning Methods to Analyze Trial-Level
Data from Cognitive Measures
by Chelsea Parlett

Many cognitive tasks and measures can benefit from trial-level analyses including Item Response Theory models as well as other Bayesian and Machine Learning models. Specifically,
this dissertation focuses mainly on task-based measures of metamemory and how within-set
variability as well as item-level characteristics can improve the inferences researchers make
about these measures.First, a clustering analysis of judgements of learning across a task
is examined in order to detect di↵erent participant strategies on a metamemory task and
whether strategy use di↵ers by age. Second, the benefits of using item response theory
models to analyze both individual and item-level di↵erences in metamemory tasks are discussed, and applications to multiple datasets are provided. Third, an extended, hierarchical
item response theory model was applied to the Child Risk Utility Measure, a tablet-based lab
measure used to measure risk taking in preschool aged children. Finally, multiple Bayesian logistic based regression models (including a cumulative logit model, logistic regression model,
and zero-one-inflated beta regression model) are applied to the metamemory task described
previously to demonstrate the benefits of performing item-level analyses especially as it pertains to di↵erences in the variability of judgements of learning in addition to mean di↵erences
between groups. Item or trial-level analyses have many benefits when applied to cognitive
tasks and measures and can provide deeper insight into observed e↵ects.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many cognitive tasks and measures (such as metamemory (MM) tasks, risk propensity tasks
like the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, and other tasks such as working memory tasks like
the N-back) are able to produce data on the trial level, however they are often scored using
unweighted sums, proportions, or averages of all trials in a set or within a participant. This
dissertation aims to demonstrate how novel applications of Machine Learning (ML) and
other statistical methods can be applied in order to take advantage of trial level data and
produce more specific, and nuanced analyses of these tasks.

1.1

Metamemory and the Metamemory Task

Throughout this dissertation, I mainly analyze data from a specific metamemory task.
Metamemory is defined as the ”individual’s knowledge of and awareness of memory” ([37]).
Metamemory has traditionally been assessed through self-report measures (such as the
Metamemory in Adulthood questionnaire), which can be confounded with the salience of
recent memory related experiences. For example in Jaeggi et. al, Older Adults participating
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Figure 1.1: Visual representation of one round of the Metamemory Task. Each word/item
is shown, and a JOL is elicited for each of 12 words. Then a free recall task is administered.
In the full Metamemory task, this process is repeated 12 times for a total of 60 words across
all five rounds.
in a cognitive training task actually rated their memories worse after training than before
despite only a few weeks passing between ratings ([89]). The authors hypothesized that the
fact that participants had had many recent observations of their memory failing (during the
difficult cognitive training task), their poor memory was more salient than during their first
rating before the experience. Objective measures of metamemory such as those from [67],
[48], [42], and [108] (as well as many others not cited here) attempt to ameliorate some of
those confounds associated with self report.
In the metamemory task described in this work, participants are shown words one at a time
for around 3 seconds, then are immediately asked to provide a Judgement of Learning (JOL)
to rate whether they will remember that word when asked to recall it at the end of the
round (see Figure 1.1) . This process is repeated 5 times with 12 di↵erent words, and then
participants are asked to recall as many words as they can using a free response text box.
This process is repeated five times for a total of 60 words across the five rounds.

1.2

Chapter Summaries

In Chapter 2 (Metamemory Performance in Older and Young Adults), I applied unsupervised machine learning which aims to detect latent structure–in this case through
clustering–in the data. I used hierarchical clustering in order to detect and describe different JOL/Betting strategies participants use on the simple metamemory task described
2

above. In this variation of the task, JOLs were elicited in a betting framework in which
participants were asked how many points (0-10) they wanted to bet on recalling each word.
If the word was recalled, the points would be added to the participant’s score, and if the
word was not recalled the points would be subtracted from their score. The hierarchical
agglomerative clustering analysis allowed me to pull out latent groups of betting strategies
across the task and examine di↵erences in strategy usage between old and young adults.
In Chapter 3 I applied a Hierarchical Bayesian Item Response Theory model to estimate
the e↵ect of age and common cognitive measures (including inhibitory control and working
memory) to asses their e↵ect on the predicted probability of having a successful trial an the
Children’s Risk Utility Measure (CRUM) which is a preschool age appropriate, tablet based
version of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) used to measure risk taking behavior
[56]. In the CRUM task, children are shown a plate of cookies and are given the opportunity
to click on the plate to add a cookie (and therefore increase their reward, paid out in stickers).
However clicking to add a cookie to their plate increases the probability that they will lose
their entire reward. Each trial ends either when the child chooses to end the trial and collect
their reward, or when they lose their reward. A successful trial in the CRUM task is one
in which the child ends the task before losing their reward. Typically, similar risk taking
measures are scored by adding up all the successful clicks a child made, divided by all the
potential clicks they could have made across trials. However, the IRT model allows for a
di↵erential weighting of each item in the task, which creates a potentially more nuanced
latent risk propensity score for each child.
In Chapter 4, I discuss and apply IRT and IRT-like models (extending the structure of the
model presented in Chapter 3) to analyses of the metamemory task discussed earlier in this
introduction. Similar to the CRUM task, metamemory performance is often measured in
aggregate using an unweighted average or sum across items for each participant (something
that is common across many cognitive measures). However, item response models provide
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latent trait scores that estimate performance. Performance can be measured with a binary
variable such as accuracy of recall, or, with a few modifications, with a continuous but
bounded variable such as a brier score (calibration). This chapter aims to provide a short
tutorial on the application of these methods to metamemory data as well as apply them to
multiple real life metamemory datasets. Benefits of analysing metamemory task data on the
trial level, as well as benefits of using the IRT framework to do so are discussed and examples
from multiple real-life metamemory datasets are presented.
In Chapter 5 I examine potential di↵erences in how participants utilize an ordinal (0-10)
bet/JOL scale in the above described MM task when the JOL is elicited as a bet rather
than an explicit JOL (e.g. ”How much would you like to bet [in points 0-10]?” vs. ”How
likely is it that you will remember the word [on a scale from 0-10]?”). I also explore whether
Behavioral Inhibition or Behavioral Approach/Avoidance (as measured by the BIS/BAS
scale [17]) moderate the e↵ect of the framing of the JOL on accuracy, scale usage, and
calibration.
Together, these chapters demonstrate ways in which researchers analyzing cognitive measures
with trial-level data can take advantage of the variation between trials to gain further insight
into their results as well as assess trial-level factors that may e↵ect the overall, omnibus
e↵ects that have been shown to exist on the set or participant level. Both Machine Learning
models as well less common applications of Statistical Models can, in some cases, improve
the inferences we are able to make in data sets utilizing cognitive measures.

4

Chapter 2
Metamemory Performance in Older
and Young Adults

Abstract
Older adults (OAs) typically experience memory failures as they age. However, with some exceptions, studies of OAs’ ability to assess their own memory functions–Metamemory (MM)–
find little evidence that this function is susceptible to age-related decline. Our study examines OAs’ and young adults’ (YAs) MM performance and strategy use. Groups of YAs (N =
138) and OAs (N = 79) performed a MM task that required participants to place bets on how
likely they were to remember words in a list. Our analytical approach includes hierarchical
clustering, and we introduce a new measure of MM—the modified Brier—in order to adjust
for di↵erences in scale usage between participants. Our data indicate that OAs and YAs
di↵er in the strategies they use to assess their memory and in how well their MM matches
with memory performance. However, there was no evidence that the chosen strategies were
associated with di↵erences in MM match, indicating that there are multiple strategies that
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might be e↵ective (i.e. lead to similar match) in this MM task.

2.1

Introduction

Imagine two older adults (OAs), Grandparents A and B, with a handful of grandchildren
each. Grandparent A is quite confident that he would be able to remember all of his grandchildren’s birthdays and prepare birthday presents on time. Grandparent B, on the other
hand, is not as confident, and strategically marks down the birthdays on her calendar.
This scenario illustrates the concept of metamemory (MM). MM, how one thinks about
one’s own memory ability, is multifaceted and various definitions exist. One dominant view
breaks MM down into three components: MM knowledge (a person’s belief and thoughts
about his/her own memory ability), memory monitoring (the assessment of self’s likelihood
of remembering something), and memory control (the actions or strategies that the two
previous components may lead to; see [30] [76]). In our example, the Grandparents have
varying beliefs (MM knowledge) regarding their ability to remember birthdays, and as they
monitored and assessed their own beliefs, they arrived at two di↵erent control strategies
to ensure successful outcomes (Grandparent A doing nothing and Grandparent B spending
the time to write the birthdays in her calendar). Another, not necessarily conflicting, view
stems from the classic MM paper by [36] that treats MM as having person, task, and strategy
aspects. While the person and strategy aspects map onto the knowledge and control elements
of the later conceptualization of MM, the task aspects refer to the kind of materials that make
it easier or harder for a person to remember. To clarify this distinction, let us return to the
Grandparents. It may be easier for Grandparent A to remember the kids’ birthdays because
he might not have as many grandchildren as Grandparent B does. This is analogous to having
a shorter list length of elements to remember, which is an example of the task aspect of MM.
Alternatively, at the person level, Grandparent A’s family could have the habit of celebrating
6

every birthday whereas Grandparent B’s does not, thereby making birthdays more salient for
Grandparent A, resulting in Grandparent A being more confident in his ability to remember
the kids’ birthdays. Because of this confidence or metamemory knowledge, Grandparent A
might not expend much energy to devise cognitive control or strategies for remembering the
grandchildren’s birthdays.

2.1.1

How is MM Studied?

Historically, due to the need or desire for meaningful, translational research for MM that
could be applied to real life, MM has been measured via self-report questionnaires. These
questionnaires may touch upon real life scenarios that laboratory experiments cannot simulate, such as reported self-appraisal of one’s own memory in regular circumstances, the reported frequency of mnemonic strategy uses in the Multifactorial MM Questionnaire (MMQ;
[101]), memory issues and/or changes associated with healthy aging in the MM in Adulthood Questionnaire (MIA; [29]), or reports of how often survey respondents forget things
in di↵erent situations, the seriousness and consequences of such forgetfulness, and comparison of past and present memory abilities in the Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ;
[39]). Although these questionnaires o↵er insights into the perceived memory abilities, or
the MM knowledge, of participants, the lack of objective measures of MM means they do
not paint a complete picture of people’s MM. Indeed, one consistent objective among MM
research is the push to go beyond merely making a judgment about the beliefs. Researchers
are equally interested in the accuracy of people’s MM beliefs. This central interest may
have practical value. If Grandparent A, despite the high level of confidence, were terrible at
remembering the birthdays, then his poor MM would mean missed birthdays and, perhaps,
disappointed grandchildren. If, on the other hand, Grandparent B were actually excellent at
remembering birthdays, then her underestimation of her own memory ability would mean
wasted time and, perhaps, an annoyed partner who does not understand why she is always
7

writing things down. If we had a clearer understanding of MM in aging and, in particular,
what strategies were beneficial for whom, then interventions could be tailored to meet the
specific needs of individuals such as Grandparents A and B. With the practical implications
of MM, the focus of much of the most recent research on MM has rested on monitoring
and control with judgment of learning (JOL) playing an important role [76]. In JOL tasks,
participants are typically asked to predict or estimate their memory performance. Though
sometimes defined as ”judgments of the likelihood of remembering recently studied items on
an upcoming test” ([76], p. 286, emphasis added), JOL tasks come in various forms. For
example, in the classic MM Battery [8], the Memory Estimation subtest that closely resembles JOL asks participants to first predict how many items they would remember from a list
of 15. More recently, the field has shifted to examine JOL in a more fine-grained manner.
Rather than taking JOL on the overall test level (out of all of your grandchildren, how many
birthdays would you remember), researchers are increasingly more interested in JOL at the
item level (e.g., how likely are you to remember grandkid 1’s birthday, grandkid 2’s birthday,
and so on). For example, in a value-directed remembering task [19] [18], participants made
JOLs by placing ”bets” on word items that they thought they would remember later [62].
In the ”bets” version, the JOL is essentially reduced to a yes/no decision. As mentioned
earlier, monitoring judgments by themselves form only one part of MM. The accuracy of
these judgments is of special interest. Yet accuracy of the JOLs has also been investigated
in various ways. In particular, researchers distinguish between relative accuracy (resolution)
and absolute accuracy (calibration; see [87] for a discussion). Say Grandparent A has to go
out shopping. For all the items they have to buy, Grandparent A is fairly confident (e.g.,
80% for remembering to get eggs and co↵ee to 100% rating for remembering to get bread and
milk) that they would remember items. Grandparent A would have low calibration if they
end up remembering only half of the shopping list. However, the resolution would still be
high if Grandparent A remembers the higher rated items (in this case, bread and milk) more
than the lower-rated items (in this case, eggs and co↵ee). Empirically, how calibration scores
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are calculated varies depending on the tasks and, therefore, no consistent calibration measurement exists. In the MM Battery, for instance, the accuracy of the memory estimation
subtest is calculated via a somewhat arbitrary equation that weights the estimation with a
separate list before the actual recall test di↵erently from the estimation performed after the
recall test with yet another list of items [8]. In the recent value-directed tasks [62], because
the researchers’ purpose was to examine learning and strategies associated with item values
and the JOL was based on a simple yes/no decision, the calibration score could only be calculated as a simple subtraction between actual number of items recalled and the number of
items on which a bet was placed. To date, no MM measure has combined an objective MM
task with a more fine-grained measure of participants’ own beliefs regarding their memory
on any particular item, which is the aim of the present work.

2.2

Metamemory across the Lifespan

Despite the di↵erential trajectories of various cognitive functions across the lifespan with
many memory-related functions showing age-related cognitive decline [83][43], monitoring of
MM has shown relatively little age e↵ects. Judgments of one’s ability to remember things
are notoriously difficult to measure in children and are only loosely associated with other
established constructs of MM such as strategy use [27]. As people age, JOL measures have
yielded much more reliable and consistent findings. When it comes to the absolute accuracy
of JOLs, adults, both young and old, tend to be overconfident in their memory ability, often
overestimating the number of items they can remember, though this overconfidence seems
to be much more inflated in older adults (e.g. [21]; [62]). Moreover, this overconfidence may
be more restricted to single or initial block of trials, as there is also evidence that people can
adjust their calibration based on practice, sometimes attenuating their ratings to the point of
underestimating their ability in a phenomenon known as the underconfidence-with-practice
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(UWP) e↵ect [55] [75] [93] [96].
Nevertheless, exceptions do exist for the robust UWP e↵ect (e.g., [62]; [75]). For example,
in the novel paradigm where participants made judgments to ”bet” on the likelihood of
remembering words based on their assigned values, neither older nor younger adults became
underconfident in later word lists [62]. It should be noted that participants did indeed lower
their number of bets in subsequent lists and became more calibrated later on, but they
never remembered more words than they bet on [62]. This surprising lack of UWP could
possibly be related to the novel ”betting” paradigm where the binary yes/no decision and
its accuracy could mean more or fewer points in the final score. More research using this
”betting” paradigm would therefore be beneficial in addressing some of these discrepancies.
In addition to the initial overconfidence (albeit to di↵erent degrees) as measured by absolute
accuracy of their monitoring judgments, YAs and OAs display similar patterns in monitoring
relative accuracy (e.g., [46]; [45]; [33]; [96];[93]). For example, in experiments with word-pair
associative learning tasks with an explicit instruction to form and use mental imagery for the
word pairs, YAs and OAs based their JOLs on whether they were able to successfully form
an image (there was no age di↵erence in imagery formation success), suggesting that both
YAs and OAs were e↵ective in monitoring their memory and strategy–image formation–use
[33]. Similarly, gamma correlation measures between JOLs and recall showed both YAs and
OAs were equally accurate in monitoring their memory of texts that they read [93].
Nonetheless, some earlier studies showed that OAs use monitoring to a lesser extent than YAs
do [31]; [92]. Additionally, even though the UWP e↵ect has been shown in both age groups,
sometimes OAs do not display the underestimation following learning in the first trial [75]. In
two experiments varying in the number of trials (two trials only in experiment 1 and five trials
in experiment 2), both YAs and OAs overestimated their ability to remember word pairs
during the first trial. However, only YAs underestimated in the subsequent trials despite
improvements in estimation in both groups [75]. Beyond memory monitoring, it appears that
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YAs and OAs also share methods of memory control or strategy [97], though some patterns
of di↵erences have also emerged. One classic method of investigating individuals’ cognitive
control or strategy use is to have participants make decisions regarding how they would
allocate study time (e.g., [19]; [31]; [63]; [70], [71]). Across di↵erent studies that varied the
items in terms of difficulty or values (i.e. points awarded), two patterns emerged. First, both
YAs and OAs tended to prioritize easier items over harder items. Second, both groups tended
to prioritize high value items (e.g., [19]; [70]). However, OAs were only likely to prioritize
high value items that were also easy, whereas YAs were more likely to prioritize high value
items regardless of difficulty. This strategy di↵erence may be related to OAs’ lower memory
self-efficacy [70]. Furthermore, studies demonstrated that in learning a novel calculation
task, OAs were less likely and slower to switch from computing to retrieval strategy after
repeated exposures to the same stimuli [100]. Similarly, OAs were less likely to use retrieval
as a strategy in noun-pair associative learning tasks [78].
Thus, there seem to be subtle di↵erences between YAs and OAs in various aspects of MM.
Still, while the literature on MM in OAs has been developing for some time now, there
is no consensus regarding whether MM accuracy is impacted by aging, or whether specific
strategy use might play a role in any di↵erences or the lack thereof. Furthermore, the literature appears fairly settled on the analytical approaches to MM, employing straightforward
deviation scores (e.g. Brier scores) for calibration, and gamma correlations for resolution.
Though the distinction of absolute versus relative accuracy is imperative as they answer
di↵erent questions pertaining to di↵erent underlying metacognitive mechanisms (calibration
pointing to judgment precision and resolution to the correspondence between judgment and
performance; see discussion in [86]), the two measures may sometimes be at odds with each
other, making an overall inference about one’s MM difficult. For example, the robust UWP
e↵ect exists only for absolute accuracy (calibration); in the studies that demonstrated UWP
in calibration, participants’ resolution actually improves in later blocks or presentations of
trials (e.g., [54]). Considering the discrepant findings for calibration and resolution, a hybrid
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score may be useful in enhancing our understanding of MM and any age-related di↵erences.
In order to conceptualize a ”new” approach to examine MM data, we will provide a brief
overview of the traditional, established methods in the following.

2.2.1

Calibration

Calibration, or absolute accuracy of the participants’ judgment as compared with their actual
performance, is typically a deviation score calculated via subtraction between performance
and judgment. Sometimes this subtraction is done in a straightforward manner (e.g., [54];
[62]), while other times researchers calculate calibration using equations that assign di↵erent
weights to di↵erent lists (e.g., [8]). Among the varied methods of calculating calibration,
one measure (and its variants) stands out and is most commonly used: Brier score (in MM
literature, also known as calibration index; see [86]):

n

1X
(acci
n i=1

joli )2

(2.1)

Brier score measures the accuracy of probabilistic predictions [81] and provides the precision
of the confidence ratings (i.e. JOL). As the equation would suggest, a score of zero corresponds to perfect accuracy (imagine JOL of 100% and performance of 100%, (100 100)2 = 0)
and a score of one would be no accuracy (for example, a 100% JOL and 0% performance).
Thus, counterintuitively, a higher score is considered having ”worse” MM using this index.
The precise nature of this score also comes with another caveat: individuals may have internal di↵erences in providing confidence ratings. For example, cross-cultural studies of
responses on Likert scale surveys revealed that Asian and Asian American participants are
less likely than other ethnic groups to mark the extreme values (e.g., [7]; [20]). Thus, two
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people who are equally confident may place their ratings based on di↵erent internal scales
despite being given the same scale of, say, 0-10, and Brier score does not correct for potential scaling di↵erences. Resolution. This caveat of absolute scores can be addressed by
examining participants’ relative accuracy, or resolution. In MM research, gamma correlation
[65] is most commonly used to examine how well participants’ judgments correspond with
their actual performances (e.g., [52]; [53]). Because the correlation is largely contingent upon
variability among the ratings and performances, cases with extreme scores (e.g., JOLs of all
100% or 0 or 100% accuracy) had to be excluded. While this does not interfere with the
theoretical validity of gamma, it can present practical issues. In the current dataset, around
17% of gamma values were non-computable. Because of this artifact and because participants’ performance tends to become better throughout an experiment, resolution scores from
one block to the next are often calculated based on dwindling sample sizes (see for example
[54]).

2.2.2

Discrimination

Yet another dimension in MM studies is the concept of discrimination, or the extent to which
confidence ratings between correct and incorrect items di↵er and can be distinguished from
one another [86]. Positive discrimination scores would indicate that participants were more
confident on items they recalled correctly than non-recalled items. Conceptually, discrimination would be an ideal, additional construct to measure metacognitive awareness. However,
as the comparison would be between correct and incorrect items (rather than within item
JOL and accuracy comparison as in the case of calibration), discrimination scores are calculated at the aggregate level and may be less precise.
Resolution and discrimination scores have been instrumental for theory development (e.g.,
cue-utilization theory), providing insights into the mechanisms with which people make con-
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fidence ratings or monitor their own knowledge or memory. Yet, the addition of a hybrid
score may address some practical concerns, ranging from something as trivial as answering
participants’ questions of ”I feel like I did worse later. Am I right?” to something more
substantial as addressing the cases when the data do not allow for proper, meaningful calculation of resolution scores. Having a hybrid score that takes into account both the precision
and association between judgment and performance may be helpful as a first-step presentation of a birds-eye view of the metamemory scheme before breaking down into the details of
the mechanisms with which people monitor their knowledge and memory.
To address these issues, our study employs a novel version of a MM task that allows for a more
detailed assessment of participants’ own beliefs regarding their memory on any particular
item. Further, we use machine learning methods to understand nuances in the data that may
shed light on these issues in a way that traditional analytical methods have not been able to
in the past. To do so, we take advantage of the fine-grained nature of the individual word
bets. Rather than having participants estimate their memory at the list level, providing
judgment ratings at the item level allows for a more nuanced understanding of MM. We seek
to answer the question of whether older and younger adults di↵er in their MM, as measured
by a new hybrid, mBrier score, and how their strategy use might a↵ect the new hybrid MM
mBrier scores.

2.3
2.3.1

Methods
Participants

Data was collected from 233 YAs and OAs. Healthy OAs were recruited through flyers
distributed in community centers in Southern California, and they received monetary compensation for their participation. YAs were undergraduate social science students who par14

ticipated for course credit. Data for all participants were collected in a controlled laboratory
setting. Sixteen (n = 13 OAs; n = 3 YAs) participants were excluded due to technical difficulties, or missing/corrupted data. Listwise deletion was used for missing data due to the
restrictions imposed by our clustering methods. The final analytical sample consisted of 79
OAs (mean age = 73.72, SD = 4.91; 62 women; vocabulary score 22.08, SD = 3.89) and 138
YAs (mean age = 20.71, SD = 2.38; 101 women; vocabulary score 15.44, SD = 3.65).

2.3.2

MM Task

This MM task was adapted from a similar computerized task by [62]. Participants were
presented with five rounds of 12 words, shown one at a time with the overall instruction to
remember as many words as possible. After each word was shown for 3 seconds, participants
were given up to 5 seconds to place a bet (a version of a JOL) between 0 and 10 points.
After seeing the 12 words, participants were asked to recall as many words as possible by
typing them into the computer. They were told that if they correctly remembered a word,
the bet for their word would be added to their score. If they did not remember a word,
their bet would be subtracted from their score. Participants were given unlimited time to
recall the words of each list. Extra words that were entered (i.e. words not in the list) were
not counted in their score. Correct spelling and tense were required in order to be counted
as correct, however participants were allowed to correct misspellings if they noticed them.
After each round, participants were presented with their score–the MM score–for that round
before proceeding to the next round of 12 words. The experimenter further explained that
the objective is for the participants to get as high of a score as possible.
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2.3.3

Word Selection

One version of the word list was adapted from [62]. For the other, we combined the sets
of words from the English Lexicon Project [6], which contains the Hyperspace Analogue
to Language (HAL) word frequency norms [59] from the HAL corpus of about 131 million
words, with databases containing valence [105] and imageability [11]. Only words with
ratings for these lexical features remained in the potential stimuli pool. We further limited
the stimuli to 4-7 letter words that are nouns, neutral in terms of emotional valence (1
standard deviation around the median of valence), high frequency (1 standard deviation
around the 75th percentile of the frequency index), and neutral imageability (1 standard
deviation around the median). To create the second version, we randomly selected 60 of the
words and split them into 5 lists. As mentioned earlier, each word list contains 12 words
(therefore each version has 60 words). Within sets, every participant received the same five
lists in the same order. However, participants were randomly assigned to receive either set
A or B.
While there is a significant di↵erence between the number of correctly recalled words between
the two versions (p = 0.02, Bayesian analysis did not provide strong support for a di↵erence,
with a BF10 = 0.986) as well as di↵erences in frequency, valence, concreteness, imageability
and length (p’s < 0.01, BF10 ’s > 13, all BF10 ’s but valance > 192), there was not a significant di↵erence between the average bets nor mBrier scores (score described below), arousal,
nor polysemy (BF10 < 0.827). Exact summary statistics are available in the Supplementary
materials. Within each version, there is no significant e↵ect of round (1-5) or interaction
between version and round in any word characteristics, signifying that within versions, the
word lists for round do not di↵er significantly. Furthermore, for all clusters examined in
this paper, there was no statistically significant di↵erence between the distributions of version between clusters (i.e. clusters did not have significantly di↵erent proportions of either
version) Bayesian analysis agreed, finding no strong evidence that there is a di↵erence in
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distribution between the two versions (all BF10 ’s < 0.86 ). mBrier Score. The MM score
as described above, is a measure of both MM and raw memory capacity, and, along with
the number of words recalled irrespective of bets, has been used as the primary dependent
variable for that measure [62].
Participants with high scores must both have good MM and be able to remember some
words, since the only way to gain points is to correctly recall a word. While this specific
combined measure is useful, there is also a need to tease apart the memory capacity and
MM components of this score. This paper o↵ers a di↵erent, supplementary score, called the
modified Brier score (mBrier) that o↵ers better insight into the MM component of the task.
We will provide vignettes and general descriptions of when mBrier o↵ers better or more
practical scores over two traditional measures of metamemory performance: Gamma and a
traditional Brier score.
The mBrier score is a hybrid score (for a description of hybrid scores, see [86]). Its calculation
follows the traditional Brier score calculation. However, instead of using binary JOLs, or
even continuous percentages (e.g. the numerical response to ”what is the probability that
you will remember this word?”), the mBrier score uses a scaled and ranked transformation of
the JOLs. Bets/JOLs ranked from 1 to n, with n being the number of non-zero bets/JOLs.

n

1X
(acci
n i=1

Rjoli )2

(2.2)

where Rjoli is the ranked jol,where rank is calculated after excluding all jols=0. In order to
calculate the ranked JOLs, first, all items that were given a JOL of 0 are excluded, and left
as 0’s. Then, the remaining items’ JOLs are ranked. The resulting ranked JOLs are then
scaled by the maximum rank in order to get a probability between 0 and 1. Traditionally,
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many MM studies have used the Goodman-Kruskal gamma as a measure of resolution. The
formula for gamma is show below for ease of reference.

G=

(Ns Nd )
(Ns + Nd )

(2.3)

Where Ns is the number of concordant word pairs (e.g. where the bet of word A is higher
than the bet of word B, and the accuracy of word A is higher than word B) and Nd is the
number of discordant pairs (e.g. where the JOL of word A is higher than the JOL of word
B, and the accuracy of word A is lower than word B). In this calculation, all pairs where
either the JOL or accuracy are the same (e.g. if a subject recalled or did not recall both
words, or gave the same JOL for both words) are discarded.
While Gamma is generally a useful resolution measure, it can be lower when JOLs are not
binary [52]. There have also been concerns about reliability of Gamma (e.g., [49]; [99]) and
how Gamma appeared unrelated to task difficulty and individual di↵erences [61]. The lack of
reliability could be related to how many item pairs are excluded in the Gamma calculation.
This is of particular concern, as patterns are not noncomputable at random, rather, certain
patterns are more likely to be excluded, such as bet/JOL perseveration.
This is increasingly impactful towards the extremes of the Gamma score (-1 and 1). The
modified Brier score is highly negatively correlated with Gamma (r = -0.71 in this sample;
correlation is negative because Gamma and mBrier are coded di↵erently with high Gamma
scores and low mBrier scores both indicating good performance), however it shows the most
di↵erence at the extremes. The negative correlation is due to the fact that Gammas score
from -1 to 1 with 1 being the highest performance, while Brier scores go from 0 to 1 with
0 being the highest performance. An example from our dataset of where the modified Brier
score allows better di↵erentiability between MM performance is presented below.
Participants A and B (data is pulled from our dataset) both have a Gamma of 1 (the highest
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Figure 2.1: Scatterplot showing relationship between Gamma scores and Modified Brier
scores for this sample of data.
score possible), however they score very di↵erently using a modified Brier score (0.585 and
.183 respectively).
There is a clear di↵erence in the performance of these two participants, yet this di↵erence
is not captured by Gamma. Participant A gives maximum JOLs for all but 1 word, and
only recalls 4 of them. However, because 11 out of the 12 JOLs are the same (10), the
number of pairs that Gamma considers for Participant A is severely limited. Since there
Table 2.1: Vignette 1 - Example of when Gamma (G) and mBrier lead to di↵erent results.
ID
A

B

word
bet
(jol)
acc
bet
(jol)
acc

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

10

10

10

10

10

10

5

10

10

10

10

10

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

10

10

3

3

3

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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G

mBrier

1

0.585

1

0.183

Table 2.2: Vignette 2 - Example of when Gamma (G) and mBrier lead to di↵erent results.
ID
C
D

word
bet(jol)
acc
bet(jol)
acc

a
2
1
1
1

b
1
1
5
1

c
1
1
4
1

d
4
0
1
1

e
3
0
3
1

f g
4 4
0 0
1 2
1 1

h
4
0
10
0

i
3
0
6
0

j k
4 3
0 0
5 5
0 0

l
3
0
10
0

G

mBrier

-1

0.679

-1

0.57

is only one low JOL, we can only consider pairings that include the word associated with
this JOL. Since it was not recalled, we also must exclude pairings with words that were
not recalled. In this case, it leads to a situation in which the one non-recalled word with a
low JOL (”owl”), is only compared to recalled words. This leads to exclusively concordant
pairs (owl-girl, owl-frog, owl-bus, owl-apple), and thus a high gamma. However, examining
Participant A’s strategy reveals that for the most part, they are not good at appropriately
assigning JOLs, they happened to have one case in which they did appropriately assign a
lower JOL to a non-recalled word. On the other hand, Participant B also has a Gamma of 1,
however it’s clear from the strategy of Participant B, that they have a better grasp of giving
appropriate JOLs. While they did recall one low JOL word (”help”), overall their JOLs are
high for recalled words and low for non-recalled words. Their betting pattern allows Gamma
to reflect this, unlike with Participant A. Similarly, two participants, C and D (again, pulled
from our dataset), both have a Gamma of -1. However, their scores using our score are quite
di↵erent (0.679 and 0.570 respectively).
In the case of Participant D, the Gamma score and our score coincide: both give it an
almost maximally low score (-1 is the lowest possible Gamma, indicating that JOLs are
inversely correlated with accuracy. If you give a low JOL, you’re most likely to recall the
word. However, Participant C got the same Gamma as Participant D, however, looking at
their performance, it’s possible to see that while they were more likely to remember words
with low JOLs, the magnitude of the inappropriateness of their JOLs is smaller, reflected
in our score of -0.55. Di↵erentiating between these two patterns is important, and the
authors believe that a single score reflecting potential discrepancies is useful, even though
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it is valuable to look at calibration and resolution separately and does not replace Gamma.
Our hybrid score represents a comprehensive overview of performance that allows for finer
grained di↵erentiation. This is especially valuable at the extreme ends of Gamma Scores.
Importantly, and specifically to our task and dataset, Gamma has an undefined value when
either all JOLs are the same, or all accuracies are the same (either all words recalled or none
recalled). Unfortunately, this scenario happens often, specifically, in about 17% of rounds
in our sample. Since full feature vectors are needed to perform good hierarchical clustering,
using Gamma’s reduces the data set from 217 to 139, signaling that at least 78 of the original
217 participants had at least one noncomputable gamma value. Brier Scores. Brier scores
are the mean squared error of JOLs (taken as a probability) compared to accuracy of recall or
recognition. Brier scores also are computable on an item-by-item level. A comparison with
mBrier which is also computable on an item-by-item level is discussed below. The formula
for Brier score shown below are sometimes referred to as the absolute accuracy (calibration)
index (see [86]).

n

1X
(fi
n i=1

oi )2

(2.4)

where fi is the preditcted probability of success between 0 and 1. And oi is the accuracy,0 or
1. As a measure of calibration, Brier scores treat JOLs as probabilities of recall. However,
di↵erent participants often use the scale in this task di↵erently. This is especially important
in this task, where JOLs were framed as ”bets”. In order to account for this, the modified
Brier score uses the scaled rank of the JOL rather than the unranked JOL in its calculation.
The following vignette is an example of when mBrier is helpful, and was chosen specifically
to elucidate more clearly when mBrier is beneficial. Two participants, Participants E and
F (data extracted from our study), could have a similar MM performance, but because of
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Table 2.3: Vignette 3 – Example of where Brier and mBrier scores di↵er.
ID
E
F

word
bet(jol)
acc
bet(jol)
acc

a
4
1
10
1

b
4
1
10
1

c
4
1
10
1

d
4
1
10
1

e
4
0
10
0

f g
2 2
0 0
0 0
0 0

h
2
0
0
0

i
2
0
0
0

j k
2 2
0 0
0 0
0 0

l
2
0
0
0

Brier

mBrier

0.23

0.18

0.09

0.18

their di↵erent uses of the JOL scale, have di↵erent Brier Scores.
By using a modified, ranked Brier score, information above and beyond calibration alone
can be observed. In the above case, both participants would receive a modified Brier score
of 0.18. In this respect, our modified score shares characteristics with both calibration and
resolution. Again, this is especially important in the current task because JOLs were framed
as bets rather than percentages. Derived from the classic absolute accuracy index (i.e. Brier
score), our modified score utilizes rank order, resulting in scores that would highlight relative
accuracy. Our score aims to account for di↵erences in scale usage by using the ranked value
of bets.

2.3.4

Analytical Approach

For strategy clusters, the raw bets for all 60 (5x12) words were used, resulting in a 60dimensional vector. For mBrier clusters, the mBrier score for each round was used, resulting
in a 5-dimensional vector.

Hierarchical Clustering

Hierarchical Agglomerative clustering was used to cluster both the raw betting and mBrier
data at the participant level. Hierarchical Clustering reveals the hierarchical structure of
groups within the data, allowing for more both coarse and fine-grained analyses of di↵er-
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ent strategies and calibration improvements. In Hierarchical Agglomerative clustering–also
called bottom-up clustering–each data point starts o↵ as its own singleton cluster. Each
cluster is then continually merged with the next closest cluster until all the data points are
in one cluster [104]. Multiple linkage criteria exist to determine the distance between two
clusters. In this analysis, complete-linkage was used. The results of Hierarchical Agglomerative clustering can be shown visually using a dendrogram that shows the nested structure
of the clusters. Hierarchical clustering allows for the examination of multiple levels of nested
clusters. Hierarchical clustering was performed on 60 dimensional vectors of participant’s
bets across all 60 trials. For mBrier scores, 5 dimensional vectors of average mBrier scores by
round were used. Using unsupervised machine learning methods like hierarchical clustering
can help detect naturally occurring groups in the data. For example, participants who use
di↵erent betting strategies, or participants who have similar trajectories for improvement of
their mBrier scores. We believe that looking at the hierarchical structure of clusters will be
beneficial because it will allow for the examination of similarities between di↵erent clusters.
This will allow researchers to look at as coarse or fine-grained clusters as necessary. In some
situations, it may be beneficial to look a high level, coarser clusters, especially in the case
that clusters are used as a basis for targeted interventions. However, looking at lower level,
more fine-grained clusters may be useful when looking at individual di↵erences. The highest
level clusters (2 and 3 clusters) were examined in the present paper in order to pull out high
level di↵erences between di↵erent strategies and performances.

Application to our Dataset

Data for all participants, regardless of age were clustered on both their bets and their mBrier
scores over time. This helps distinguish groups of participants who have either similar
strategies when completing the task, or similar improvements over time, i.e. across the 5
rounds. The betting strategy groups are of special interest since it will allow us to a) define
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for OAs and YAs.
N
Bets
Words Recalled mBrier
OAs 79 4.12(2.99)
3.67(1.98)
0.44(0.23)
YAs 138 4.6(3.39)
5.99(1.94)
0.39(0.14)
Note. The average scores across all lists (12 words per list) for bets (JOLs), words recalled,
and mBrier score are provided. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

and describe di↵erent strategies used on this task, and then b) investigate whether OAs
use di↵erent strategies than YAs. We can also test whether there is a di↵erential e↵ect
of strategy use on mBrier score (i.e. whether certain strategies are associated with higher
mBrier). Understanding the di↵erent strategies and their association with lower mBrier may
pave the way for interventions that teach strategies that are helpful for OAs.

2.4

Results

Summary Statistics for the data are shown in Table 2.2. Data were analyzed using R (3.4.3
Kite-Eating Tree) and JASP (JASP Team (2018). Version 0.8.3.1).

2.4.1

Bets and Correctly Recalled Words by Age

Average bets across all 60 words was not significantly di↵erent between OAs and YAs (t(215)
= 1.769, p = 0.078, d= 0.25; BF10 = 0.661). However, as expected, the average number of
correctly recalled words was significantly di↵erent between OAs and YAs, with OAs remembering less words (t(215) = 11.06, p < 0.001, d = 1.56 ; BF10 = 3.651e19).
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Figure 2.2: A radar graph showing the average mBrier score for OAs (red) and YAs (blue)
across all 5 rounds of the MM task. Lower scores are better. The scale on the left shows the
progression of values from the center of the circle, outwards.

2.4.2

mBrier Score by Age

OAs had a significantly worse average mBrier score than YAs (t(215)= -7.681, p < 0.001,
d = -1.084, BF10 = 1.152e10). The hybrid mBrier scores across rounds–instead of overall
averages–can be seen plotted in Figure 2.2. In order to test whether age di↵erences emerge
over time, we ran a repeated measures ANOVA with age group as between subject factor and
round as within factor, which revealed a significant age group × round interaction, agreeing
the with Bayes Factor for this analysis (F(4,860) = 4.53, p = 0.001; BFinteraction = 9.77).

2.4.3

Hierarchical Strategy Clustering

This dendrogram reveals less separable clusters (compared to dendrograms with more density
at the bottom) since the dendrogram is denser in the middle range of the y-axis than at the
bottom. Typically, clusters that are cohesive and separate (i.e. items in a cluster are very
close to other items in that cluster, and far away from items in other clusters) will have
25

Figure 2.3: Dendrogram from hierarchical clustering of betting strategy data at the participant level showing the relative distances between clusters (Height) and their hierarchical
structure. The distance between clusters visually represents how di↵erent clusters are from
one another, whereas the hierarchical arrangement shows how clusters are nested within one
another.
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dendrograms that are denser at the lower range of the y-axis (i.e. more connections will be
made in the lower range of the y-axis).

Two Strategy Clusters

First, we look at the two highest level clusters: Cluster 1 consisted of relatively low bets and
low variance between bets. Instead, Cluster 2 consisted of high bets, and higher variance.
These patterns can be seen more clearly in the Radar graph in Figure 2.4a.

[a]

[b]

Figure 2.4: a. Radar Graph displaying bets for the two-cluster analysis. The first cluster
(low variation and low average bets) is shown in red, and the second cluster (higher variation
and higher average bets) is shown in blue. The Radar graphs display the mean bets with
each spoke representing the bets for an item. Items are read clockwise from the 12 o’clock
position onward. The scale on the left shows the progression of values from the center of
the circle, outwards. b. Barplot showing counts of OAs (left) and YAs (right) for the two
strategy clusters shown in a. Cluster 1 represents low bets/low variance, Cluster 2 represents
high bets/high variance.
Figure 2.4b displays the distributions of OAs (left) and YAs (right) between these two
clusters. A chi-square test of independence revealed no significant di↵erence in strategy
usage between OAs and YAs (

2

(1) = 0.5575,p =0.4553; BF10 0.249; Fisher’ s Exact Test,p

= 0.3815 ). Fisher’s Exact Test was run for all analyses since some cluster assignments
resulted in an expected cell value smaller than 5.
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Three Strategy Clusters Clustering the betting strategy data into three clusters again yielded
the same cluster with relatively low bets and low variance between bets, which we will now
refer to as Cluster 3 (blue). And Cluster 2–with high bets, and higher variance–remained
largely the same (green). Cluster 1, is characterized by extreme variance, and a cyclical
pattern between each of the 5 rounds (note the 5 spikes in red in Figure 2.5a). Clusters
1 and 3 in this analysis were previously clustered together in the 2-cluster analysis above.
These patterns can be seen more clearly in the Radar graph in Figure 2.6a.

[a]

[b]

Figure 2.5: a. Radar Graph displaying bets for the three-cluster analysis. The third cluster
(low bets/ low variance) is shown in blue, and the second cluster (high bets/high variance)
is shown in green, and the first cluster (high variance and more cyclical betting patterns) is
shown in red. The scale on the left shows the progression of values from the center of the
circle, outwards. b. Barplot showing distribution of OAs (left) and YAs (right) between the
three strategy clusters shown in a.
The distributions of Older and YAs between these clusters is shown in Figure 2.5b. Both a
chi square test of independence and a Fisher’s exact test again did not reveal a significant
di↵erence in strategy usage between OAs and YAs (
;Fisher’s Exact Test,p = 0.3276).
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2

(2)= 2.268,p =0.3217;BF10 =0.105

Figure 2.6: Dendrogram from hierarchical clustering of mBrier score data on the participant
level. The distance between clusters (Height) visually represents how di↵erent clusters are
from one another, whereas the hierarchical arrangement shows how clusters are nested within
one another.

2.4.4

mBrier Clusters

The present paper will focus on analysis with 2 and 3 clusters, however, analyses using 4–9
clusters can be made available by emailing the authors.
The dendrogram for the hierarchical clustering of mBrier scores is dense at the bottom,
revealing more separable clusters since points tend to join together in the lower range of the
y-axis. On the lefthand side of the graph, a smaller cluster that is far away from the rest of
the data can be seen (as it connects to the rest of the data very high on the y-axis).

Two mBrier Clusters

In the 2-Cluster analysis, the first cluster, Cluster 1 has a relatively stable mBrier score
over all 5 rounds, and mBrier scores were relatively low (indicating higher performance)
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compared to the other cluster. Cluster 2’s mBrier scores were slightly more variable and
characterized by many ups and downs, and on average were higher (worse) than the mBrier
scores of Cluster 1. These patterns can be seen in the radar graph in Figure 2.7a.

[a]

[b]

Figure 2.7: a. Radar Graph displaying mBrier scores for the two-cluster analysis across the
five rounds. Cluster 1 (stable, low mBrier) is shown in red, Cluster 2 (higher, less stable
mBrier scores) is shown in teal. There are five spokes in the mBrier radar graph with each
spoke representing the average mBrier scores for each round. mBrier can be between 0 (the
center of the graph) and 1 (the edge of the graph) with lower scores being better. The scale
on the left shows the progression of values from the center of the circle, outwards. b. Barplot
showing distribution of OAs (left) and YAs (right) between the two mBrier score clusters
shown in a).
The distribution of OAs and YAs between these two clusters was significantly di↵erent
(

2

(1)= 28.00,p < 0.001; BF10 = 314124;Fisher’ s Exact Test,p < 0.001), suggesting that OAs

and YAs tend to di↵erentially adjust their mBrier scores across the five rounds. Compared
to YAs, OAs are more likely to be in Cluster 2, which has higher, less stable mBrier scores
(cf. Figure 2.7b). This pattern is also supported by the di↵erence in mBrier as a function
of age seen in Figure 2.2.
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Three mBrier Clusters

In the 3-Cluster analysis, Cluster 1 from the 2-Cluster analysis remains the same. Cluster 2
from the 2-cluster analysis breaks into Clusters 2 and 3. The clusters are visualized in Figure
2.7a. Cluster 1, the red regular pentagonal cluster, again contains those with relatively low,
stable mBrier scores across all five rounds. Both Cluster 2 (green) and 3 (blue) show higher
(worse performance) overall mBrier scores, as well as more variation between rounds.

[a]

[b]

Figure 2.8: a. Radar Graph displaying mBrier scores for the three-cluster analysis. Cluster
2 remained the same from the two-cluster analysis. Cluster 1 (with stable, low mBrier scores
across rounds) and 3 (blue) were previously clustered together in the 2-cluster analysis
(Cluster 1 shown in red, Figure 2.7a). Cluster 3 has more unstable mBrier scores across
rounds. The minimum mBrier score (0) is displayed at the center, with increasing mBrier
scores moving outward. The scale on the left shows the progression of values from the
center of the circle, outwards. b. Barplot showing distribution of OAs (left) and YAs (right)
between the three mBrier clusters.
The distribution of OAs and YAs between these 3 clusters, shown in Figure 2.8b, was significantly di↵erent (

2

(2) = 32.19,p < 0.001; BF10 = 64135; Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.001),

again suggesting that OAs and YAs tend to di↵erentially adjust their mBrier scores over
time.
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mBrier Score by Strategy Cluster

For the two strategy cluster analysis, there was no significant di↵erence between the two
clusters’ average mBrier score (t(215) = 1.459, p = 0.146, d = 0.207, BF10 = 0.417). This
result indicates that there is little evidence that strategy use between the two clusters has
an e↵ect on overall mBrier scores. Figure 2.8 displays the mean mBrier scores for the twostrategy clusters (left panel) and the three-strategy clusters (right panel). However, there
was a significant di↵erence between the average mBrier score of the three strategy clusters
(F(2,214) = 13.61, p < 0.001 , ⌘p2 = 0.113, BF10 = 5054.46), indicating that between these
three strategy clusters, there is a significant di↵erence between the average mBrier score,
with cluster 3 (low bet, low variation) having the worst overall mBrier scores, and cluster 1
(cyclical pattern bet) having the lowest (best performing) mBrier scores.

[a]

[b]

Figure 2.9: Mean plots of mBrier score by two (a) and three (b) cluster strategy. Error bars
represent +/- standard errors of the mean.
In order to visualize the di↵erences in mBrier scores between the clusters, radar graphs were
created. The left panel of Figure 2.9 shows the radar graph for the mBrier scores with the
two strategy clusters, and the right panel shows the graph with three strategy clusters.
Bets and Accurately Recalled Words by Strategy Cluster. Both average bet and average
number of correctly recalled words were significantly di↵erent between the two Strategy
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[a]

[b]

Figure 2.10: Radar Graphs displaying the average mBrier score between the two (a) and
three (b) strategy cluster groups as a function of round. Lower mBrier scores are closer to
the center of the graph and represent better performance. Overall, the average mBrier scores
for each of the five rounds is relatively similar for the two cluster groups. However, in the
three cluster groups, a clear pattern of lower (better) mBrier scores for cluster 1 emerges.
clusters (Bets: F(1,215) = 374.1, p < 0.001; BF10 = 1.919 e45, Accurately Recalled Words:
F(1,215) = 22.05, p < 0.001; BF10 = 3217.94), indicating that certain strategies maybe
be used di↵erentially by people, which might be related to individual di↵erences, such as
memory capacity. The same pattern was found in the three cluster analysis (Bets: F(2,214)
= 201.6, p < 0.001; BF10 = 3.96 e46, Accurate Recalls: F(2,214) = 12.21, p < 0.001; BF10
= 2761.21). Post-hoc Tukey’s HSD tests reveal a significant di↵erence in average number of
correctly recalled words between Clusters 2 and 3, indicating that Cluster 2 had a significantly
higher number of accurately recalled words (p < 0.001), and a significant di↵erence in bets
between all three clusters with Cluster 3 having significantly lower average bets (p < 0.003).

2.5

Discussion

Age-related decline in cognitive functioning has been well-documented. Indeed, in our study,
OAs recalled significantly fewer words overall, indicating poorer memory capacity. However,
it is less clear whether MM also declines with age ([13]; [83]). While we replicated the welldocumented finding that OAs demonstrated poorer memory ability as compared to YAs, the
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average bets across all 60 words was not significantly di↵erent between OAs and YAs. Since
the bets/JOLs of the OAs were on average as high as those of the YAs who demonstrated
better memory performance, and mBrier scores were significantly lower for YAs, we can
conclude that the OAs exhibited poorer MM, and displayed the overconfidence phenomenon
that has been described before (e.g. [21]; [62]). The relatively poor (high) mBrier scores in
OAs remained fairly stable across all rounds. This lack of adjustment corresponds with past
studies, which found that OAs may need more time to adjust their strategy on cognitive
tasks [78] [100]. However, since the present study only examined one administration of the
task that consisted of only five rounds, it may not have been a long enough session for OAs
to adjust their strategy. Based on the mBrier score clusters, OAs were also more likely than
the YAs to be in the lower performing clusters (cluster 2 in the two-cluster analysis and
clusters 2 and 3 in the three-cluster analysis). Across the five rounds, the MM performance
of Cluster 2 appeared to worsen from 56.96 in Round 1 to 33.92 in Round 5. This slight
decrease in performance across rounds for participants in Cluster 2 could be related to the
UWP e↵ect previously demonstrated with traditional calibration scores (e.g., [55]; [93]; [96]).
However, unlike a previous study that showed OAs to be less likely than YAs to experience
the UWP e↵ect [75], OAs in our study were more likely to be in the Cluster 2 that exhibited
the UWP e↵ect. Based on strategy cluster analysis, two distinct strategy groups emerged.
Groups either bet high on average, with high variance (high–high group; meaning that there
were bigger discrepancies between their high and low bets), or they bet low on average with
low variance (low–low group). The distribution of OAs and YAs between these clusters were
not significantly di↵erent. This is consistent with the fact that on average, there was no
di↵erence between OAs and YAs in terms of bets. The lack of age di↵erence among the
strategy clusters in our study aligns with previous studies that showed similar metacognitive
monitoring abilities between YAs and OAs (see [44] for a discussion). For details about the
mean and variability of judgement accuracy by age, see Table 2.4 and Figure 2.2).
Strategy use did not predict di↵erences in mBrier scores for the two clusters. However, there
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were significant di↵erences between the three strategy clusters, indicating that a cyclical
pattern of bets may be indicative of better mBrier scores. Di↵erences in strategy use were
also linked with di↵erences in raw memory ability (i.e. di↵erent strategies were associated
with di↵erential amounts of correctly recalled words), suggesting that certain strategies might
be more preferred by individuals depending on their memory capacities. Knowing which
strategies might lead to better recall or MM performance might help inform metacognitive
interventions in the future. It is interesting to note that those who have the highest memory
abilities, as measured by recall accuracy, did not necessarily have the best MM abilities, as
measured by the mBrier score. Specifically, in the three-strategy cluster analysis, the highhigh (cluster 2) group had the highest aggregate bets and words correct, but they had lower
mBrier scores than the cyclical (cluster 1) group. This contrast also illustrates the value
of our mBrier score. If one were to only examine participants’ performances at the word
list level, the aggregate information of high bets and high accuracy would suggest a pretty
good metamemory. However, the mBrier score was able to tease out the performance at the
word level and show a particularly useful strategy. Those who utilized the cyclical strategy of
betting high in the beginning of each round (for the first few words that appeared on the list)
were indeed better able to remember the words that appeared at the beginning of each list.
These participants–despite having lower recall accuracy or memory abilities–were able to
adopt a strategy that maximized their metamemory performance. It is yet unclear whether
the cyclical strategy is a proactive strategy to lower the amount of e↵ort needed to perform
the task of maximizing metamemory performance (i.e., the poorer recall accuracy was an
artifact to match their JOL bet ratings) or if it may be a compensatory strategy adopted by
participants who realized that their memory might not be as good (i.e., JOL bet ratings were
adjusted to match their accurately perceived memory). However, as the Radar graph (Figure
2.7) shows, the second scenario may be likely as the cyclical pattern became more obvious in
later rounds. These patterns should be examined further in future studies to see if they are
consistent across di↵erent datasets. Since unsupervised techniques are often ”more art than
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science”, standard validation techniques used in supervised Machine Learning are not able
to be applied in the same way. While these clusters match the authors’ anecdotal experience
with this task, further confirmation in other datasets is required in order to confirm validity
across di↵erent samples.
An important contribution of our study is the advancement in MM scoring and the analysis
approach. While raw MM score provides insight into both memory capacity and how well
MM matches memory performance, it is useful to look at these two components separately.
Using a mBrier score as calculated here in addition to a raw MM score allows for a reduced
impact of memory capacity on measures of MM. As participants may not view or use the
0 to 10 scale the same way, especially since the instructions to this specific task do not
ask the user to treat the 0-10 scale as a probability, ranking the bets before calculating the
Brier score lessens the impact of scale usage. Participants who used the scale di↵erently
(e.g. someone who is risk averse and only bet between 0 and 5 points, but bet higher on
words they remembered compared to someone who bet between 0 and 10 points but also bet
higher on words they remembered) were treated the same. Our mBrier score is similar to
relative accuracy (resolution) in the MM literature since it is a measure of whether the bet
magnitude is di↵erent between words that are and are not remembered, regardless of the
average magnitude of the bets. However, it allows for the use of the word-by-word numeric
JOLs rather than relying on overall correlation , the typical way resolution is measured. It
is important to note that our score is not intended to replace other established measures
such as Gamma, but to provide a hybrid measure that specifically benefits this task and
analysis which require scores to be computable for most or all trials. Looking at individual
(non-hybrid measures) is also an important part of assessing metamemory.
While our mBrier score is an improvement on the raw MM score described in the task and
shown to the participants, further improvements can still be made. Simulations may be
especially useful in the quest to examine the impact of memory capacity on mBrier score by

36

allowing for the exploration of common patterns of betting and word recall, as well as the
opportunity to explore hypothetical strategies that maximize mBrier scores depending on
memory ability. This rich set of data would benefit from more complex methods that can
take into account word and order characteristics such as the length, valance, or position of
the word in the list. Most importantly, future work will look into uncovering which strategies
are best for whom, exploring individual di↵erence variables such as baseline memory ability,
verbal skills, executive functioning, or personality factors, such as need for cognition or
self-efficacy, and examine whether the age-related di↵erences in strategy are mainly due to
reduced memory capacity, or whether it is primarily driven by these other factors. In the
present study, our use of machine-learning approaches introduces a novel and statistically
sophisticated method to the study of MM in OA, which we hope will allow for the continued
exploration of the mechanisms involved in age-related cognitive changes, with the ultimate
goal of developing strategies and interventions to support this population.

2.6

Future Work

Future work should look more closely at how ”betting” or JOL strategies change over time.
Patterns within rounds could be clustered separately to examine whether participants change
patterns/clusters over time. Individual di↵erences (such as dominant language and fluency)
and word characteristics should also be examined to see whether they exert any influence
on these patters either over the whole task or over time. This task and betting paradigm
also provides a framework to further examine what factors most influence metamemory
performance in groups of all ages. In general, understanding metamemory and the factors
that a↵ect it is important since having accurate judgements of one’s own memory can lead
to better outcomes in memory related tasks.
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Chapter 3
Application of Bayesian IRT Models
to Metamemory Tasks

Abstract
Metamemory (MM) tasks have traditionally been used to quantify an individual’s ability to
predict their memory performance. Typically, quantitative scores used to measure di↵erent
facets of MM weigh each item equally by using scores that are unweighted means or sums
of each item for each participant or set. First, this work provides and overview and short
tutorial on Item Response Theory (IRT) models as well as Zero-One-Inflated Beta regression
(and the combination of the two), and then proceeds to demonstrate how these methods can
generate both latent trait scores that weigh items di↵erently–creating a potentially more
nuanced and accurate representation of metamemory performance–as well as give insight
into the difficulty and discrimination of individual items or the e↵ect of sequential order.
Applications to multiple metamemory datasets are presented and the potential benefits of
these types of models for individual di↵erences and item level e↵ects analyses are discussed.
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3.1

Introduction

3.1.1

Metamemory

Metamemory is defined as the ”individual’s knowledge of and awareness of memory” ([37]).
Researchers and clinicians alike are often interested in how well metamemory matches actual
memory performance. Metamemory is typically measured by comparing a judgment of
learning (JOL) with a measure of actual performance (such as accuracy: was an item recalled
or not). Typically, di↵erent measures of metamemory performance are calculated on either
a per-item or a per-set basis. When scores are calculated or summarized on a per-set basis,
items are typically all weighted the same (in other words, each item contributes the same
amount of information to a general score of metamemory). However, this poses an issue
if the di↵erent items are not equally good at indicating metamemory performance. For
example, one type of metamemory task will ask participants to one by one view then give
a JOL to a set of items (say 12 items). After the entire set has been seen, participants are
asked to recall as many items as they can. This type of task is a↵ected by primacy and
potentially recency bias (although evidence suggests that recency bias is less of an influence
in the current data set, see Section 3) in addition to item-level characteristics such as valence,
length, or imageability in the case when items are words.

3.1.2

Item Response Theory

Item Response Theory (IRT) models have been used in metacognitive research before, most
notably in validations of the MIA survey (e.g. [14] , [1]). While there are a few instances
of IRT models being used to analyze metacognitive tasks (rather than surveys; [23], [3]),
their use is not as widespread in analyses of metamemory tasks ([23]. Many noted e↵ects,
such as the underconfidence with practice (UWP) e↵ect, or other changes in calibration
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over time would greatly benefit from the per-item and per-person analysis that IRT models
provide because both individual di↵erences and item di↵erences could be used to examine the
nuance of this e↵ect ([35]). With these estimates, it would be possible to look at whether item
difficulty or individual memory ability modulates the UWP e↵ect (or even the interaction).
Similarly, estimated latent memory ability (as measured by IRT models looking at accuracy of
recall) could be correlated with metrics of absolute and relative accuracy such as calibration
and resolution. An individual’s ”calibration” is high if the level of recall on particular items
matched the level they predicted, e.g., a biology student predicting that they will remember
the concept of photosynthesis 50% of the time and actually remembering it half the time.
In contrast, ”resolution” would be high as long as the relative accuracy of recalls matched.
For example, if a student predicts that they will remember photosynthesis 50% of the time
and the concept of protein synthesis 70% of the time, their resolution will be high as long as
they remember protein synthesis more than photosynthesis, even if the recall accuracy was
only 40% versus 20% rather than the predicted 70% and 50%, respectively.

3.1.3

Using IRT in Metamemory Analyses

In addition to providing a rich framework that allows item and subject-specific parameters to
be included in the analysis, Item Response Theory (IRT) models provide a factor score that
does not automatically weigh every item in a set equally. Instead, items are weighted by their
ability to discriminate between subjects high and low on the metamemory scale. This score
gives a more nuanced way to examine metamemory performance for scores (like accuracy,
brier scores, mBrier scores...etc) that are able to be measured on a trial to trial basis. It is
important to acknowledge that common scores for metamemory that are inherently measured
on the set level rather than the trial level, are not readily available for use in IRT models
which require item-level scores. To give an example of when this could be important, imagine
the experiment described above where participants view words one by one, give a JOL to a
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set of items (say 12 items), and after the entire set has been viewed, recall as many items as
they can. Evidence on memory recall studies on the primacy e↵ects (e.g., [60];[64]) suggests
that words early in the set are easier to remember, and therefore when accuracy is the
outcome of interest, these words should not count as heavily towards an overall summary of
a participants accuracy since the ease of remembering words early in the list makes them a
poor discriminator of true memory ability.
For an example outside of metacognition, imagine a spelling test where one of the words is
”banana”, and one of the words is ”chamomile”. The word ”banana” is much easier to spell,
and most people will spell it correctly. The fact that nearly everyone gets the item correct
makes it a poor discriminator of true spelling ability. IRT models take this into account
when calculating the aforementioned factor score; in this case, whether or not a participant
spelled the word ”chamomile” correctly would a↵ect that participant’s factor score more
than whether or not they spelled ”banana” correctly.
The current study argues that the IRT model (and similar variants) are a useful and underemployed method for analyzing typical metamemory tasks, and provides applications to
multiple real datasets to support the use of IRT models in the metamemory field. In Section
1 we provide an overview of basic IRT models as well as an extension to the bounded but
continuous case (which applies to scores like brier which are continuous but bound between
0 and 1) using zero-one-inflated beta regression. Section 2 and Section 3 look at the application of traditional 2pl IRT models to estimate item difficulty and latent recall ability in a
metamemory task developed by Jaeggi et al ([48]; [67]). Section 4 highlights the potential
benefit of using the latent scores generated by models such as those in Sections 2 and 3 as a
predictor in a zero-one-inflated beta regression model looking at the e↵ect of various factors
on metamemory performance. Finally, Section 5 demonstrates how zero-one-inflated beta
regression can be used with the IRT-like structure demonstrated in Sections 2-3 in order to
perform IRT-style analyses on continuous but bounded outcomes such as brier scores.
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3.2

Section 1

IRT is a widely used technique to analyze data where multiple items are used to measure
one (or more) underlying constructs. For example, in the case of metamemory tasks, those
constructs are often measures such as accuracy of recall, calibration of metamemory, or
metamemory match. The accuracy of recall is considered di↵erent from calibration or the
match of metamemory in that one can remember things very well but have poor metamemory
or vice versa. For example, a new waitress in training may think she remembers only half
of the menu items but actually remembers over 90% of them. In this case, the waitress
would have high recall accuracy but low calibration or metamemory. Though historically
calculated at a higher, block or list level, calibration and match can be performed on a more
fine-grained level. Instead of the entire menu, the waitress may be able to make judgment
calls on specific menu items like pumpkin spice latte (predicting she will remember it 100%
of the time) or mango black tea lemonade (predicting she will remember it 60% of the time).
Her actual memory recall could be 100% for both menu items, but in this case, she would be
perfectly calibrated for pumpkin spice latte, but less so for the lemonade. Each item from
a metamemory task contributes to the researcher or clinician’s understanding of a person’s
latent ability in each measure. While IRT models are often presented as discrete types of
models, because basic/binary outcome IRT models such as the Rasch, 2pl, and 3pl models
are all variations of a linear model with a logit link function, they have a huge amount of
flexibility.
The basic form of the IRT model has at least two components: item-level and person-level
characteristics. Going back to the spelling example in the previous section, IRT models
posit that the observed performance of a student on an individual spelling trial (i.e. one
word) relies on the interplay between item-level (such as word difficulty) and person-level
(latent spelling ability) characteristics. For example, we would expect someone with low
latent spelling ability to have a low probability of getting difficult words correct, and a higher
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probability of getting easier words correct. For someone with very high latent spelling ability,
we would expect to see higher probabilities of getting each of the words correct compared to
the person with low latent spelling ability.
The di↵erent, well-known IRT models are for the most part each successively more complex
versions of the previous model. In this section, we will talk about 4 models: Rasch, 2pl, 3pl,
and a beta proportion regression model. These 4 models will provide the basics we need in
order to examine the performance of IRT models in metamemory in general.

3.2.1

Binary Outcome IRT models

IRT models with binary (1/0) outcomes typically represent a correct/incorrect answer, or
a present/not present relationship. Because the outcomes are binary, we often model the
probability (which includes values between 0-1) of the outcome being correct/present using
a logistic link function.
Because probabilities are on a 0-1 bound scale, we use the logistic link function to transform
those values into a set that is more accurately modeled by a linear regression. First, the
probabilities are turned into odds. Odds generally represent the ratio of the probability of
an event happening divided by the probability of the event NOT happening. For example, if
a baseball player has a 60% chance of getting a home run during a game, the odds of them
getting a home run are

0.6
= 1.5
(1 0.6)
We can interpret these odds by saying that ”it is 1.5x more likely that they will hit a home
run, than that they will NOT hit a home run”. Odds greater than 1 indicate that the event
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is more likely to happen than not, Odds equal to one indicate that it is just as likely that the
event will happen than that it will not, and odds less than 1 indicate that it’s more likely
that the event will not happen.
In terms of metamemory tasks, we could model the probability that a participant recalls a
given item. If the probability of recall is 0.3, then the odds are

0.3
⇡ 0.429
(1 0.3)
Odds can take on any value between 0 (when the event is impossible), to infinity (when the
event is guaranteed). We then transform these odds into log odds by taking the logarithm
of the odds.

log odds = log(odds) = log(

p
1

p

)

This gives us two desirable properties: symmetry, and a range of -infinity to infinity. Symmetry refers to the fact that the log odds for P (event) are -1 times the log odds for 1 P (event).
For example, the log odds of an event with probability = 0.8 is 0.602, and the log odds of
an event with probability = 0.2 is -0.602.

Rasch Model

The Rasch model is a simple logistic model of a binary (0/1) response where the linear
equation is the di↵erence between the person-trait term (✓n ) and the item-level difficulty
term (

k ).
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Table 3.1: Exemplar Questions for BIS/BAS
BIS
BAS Reward
Responsiveness
BAS Drive
BAS Fun Seeking

Example Item
”I worry about making mistakes.”
”When good things happen to me, it a↵ects me strongly.”
”I go out ofmy way to get things I want.”
”I crave excitement and new sensations.”

P (Xnk

e ✓n k
= 1|✓n , k ) =
1 + e ✓n

k

Note that the minus sign in the formula indicates that as items increase in difficulty, the
probability of a successful response goes down.

Figure 3.1: Item Characteristic Curve (ICC) for items with di↵erent difficulties. The x-axis
represents the latent trait of a person, and the y-axis represents the probability that a person
will be successful on that item. The curves show the probability that a person at each trait
level will be successful on that item.

In 3.1, eleven Item Characteristic Curves (ICC) are shown. The Rasch model allows difficulty
to vary. As you look at the curves in 3.1 from left to right, the items go from easiest, to most
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difficult. However, the slopes of the logistic curves are the same, meaning that the change in
person trait needed to move from a predicted value of 0 (unsuccessful) to a predicted value
of 1 (successful) is the same for all items . The difficulty parameters can also be thought of
as a ”threshold” at which a person with an equivalent latent trait score would be predicted
to have a 50% chance of success on that item. For example, if difficulty is 1.27, we would
predict that a person with a latent trait score of 1.27 would have a 50% chance of success
on that item (and relatedly that someone with a latent trait score above 1.27 would have a
higher predicted probability of success...etc). The latent trait (✓; sometimes referred to as
latent ability) parameters are estimates of the latent construct the survey or task is trying
to measure for each participant.

2 parameter (2pl) Model

The 2pl model is identical to the Rasch model, except the slopes of the ICCs are allowed
to vary. Some may be steeper, some may be flatter. This is accomplished by adding a
discrimination term.

P (Xnk = 1|✓n ,

k , ↵k ) =

e↵k (✓n k )
1 + e↵k (✓n k )

This model has two item-level parameters (discrimination; ↵k and difficulty;

k ),

and the

same person-level parameter (ability; ✓n ). The discrimination parameters a↵ect the steepness of the slope, therefore they indicate how well an item discriminates between people at
di↵erent ability levels. The steeper the logistic curve, the smaller change in person ability it
takes to go from a predicted value of 0 (unsuccessful) to a predicted value of 1 (successful).
In the continuous probability sense, the steepness from the discrimination term also indicates
how large a change in predicted probability of success will result from a small change in ability with steeper logistic curves resulting in more extreme changes in predicted probability of
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success for commensurate changes in ability.

Figure 3.2: Item Characteristic Curve (ICC) for items with di↵erent discrimination values.
The x-axis represents the latent trait of a person, and the y-axis represents the probability
that a person will be successful on that item. The curves show the probability that a person
at each trait level will be successful on that item.

The discrimination parameter is often constrained to be non-negative, because a negative
discrimination term would indicate that higher person trait and lower difficulty would make
having a successful trial less likely (although negative discrimination could be used to indicate
reverse coded items). The other parameters remain the same as the Rasch model.

3 parameter (3pl) Model

The 3pl model extends the 2pl model by adding a term ck for the probability of getting an
item correct by guessing (if you plug in 0 to ck in the below formula, you get the 2pl model):

P (Xnk = 1|✓n ,

k , ↵k , ck ) = ck + (1
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ck )

e↵k (✓n k )
1 + e↵k (✓n k )

The guessing parameter provides a lower bound for the logistic curve because it indicates
that even on the most difficult item in the hands of a low-latent-trait person, there is some
probability of correctly guessing the answer. This is especially applicable to multiple choice
items where one choice must be selected. Below, you can see that the y-intercept of the
ICC curves is equal to the guessing parameter for that item. The red line (where guessing
probability = 0) looks like the typical ICCs from the 2pl and Rasch models.

Figure 3.3: Item Characteristic Curve (ICC) for items with di↵erent guessing values. The
x-axis represents the latent trait of a person, and the y-axis represents the probability that
a person will be successful on that item. The curves show the probability that a person at
each trait level will be successful on that item.

3.2.2

Bounded, Continuous Outcome IRT models

The models in the section above cover cases where the outcome variable of interest is binary.
However, there are many cases where the outcome of interest is a probability, ratio, or other
similar value that is continuous, but bounded between 0 and 1 (non-inclusive; though if 0

48

and 1 are possible, a mixture model such as the one mentioned later in this section can
be used to inflate the probability of 0’s and 1’s). In metamemory tasks, the brier score is
one such outcome. Brier scores measure how close JOLs are to actual recall. Scores range
from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating that the JOLs perfectly matched what actually occurred in
recall. Similarly, modified Brier scores as described in [67], also share the same scale. JOLs
themselves are often also on a continuous, bounded scale, especially when measured as a
probability of future recall/recognition. We could also look at the empirical probability of
getting items correct.
In the metamemory literature, calibration is often performed on the list level with average or
global judgments of learning (JOLs). Some calibration studies use 5-point or 6-point Likert
scales for participant’s JOLs (see [77]; e.g.,[2]; Robey et al., 2017; Stine-Morrow et al.,
2006), though it is increasingly being presented as a probability or percentage. Occasionally,
binary decisions (e.g., ”yes/no” for if you will recall the word) on the item level are used in
addition to other features prior to calculating the global JOL (e.g.,[62]). While a calibration
index (i.e., a deviation-based Brier score) has been developed that allows for item-by-item
calculation ([86]), it is less commonly applied because mainstream metamemory researchers
still consider absolute accuracy as pertaining to global level (rather than item level). Relative
accuracy (or resolution), in contrast, is aimed at distinguishing the distinct items that were
remembered or forgotten ([77]). Resolution is typically calculated using Kruskal-Goodman
gamma correlations at the list level ([65]).
One solution to this issue is to modify one of the IRT models mentioned in the previous
section. The traditional IRT models (take the 2pl, for example) assume that the outcome is
binary and error is Bernoulli distributed; beta regression, on the other hand assumes that
the error around the predicted value is beta distributed, allowing for scores between 0 and
1. The probability generated by taking the inverse logit of the predicted value is assumed
to be the mean of the beta distribution. The parameters in this type of model represent the
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same concepts (e.g. difficulty, ability, discrimination. . . ) as the binary versions, but instead
of assuming that the data is binary, it allows the results to be any probability/proportion.
Because MM measures often allow exact 0’s and 1’s (in brier scores, 0’s indicate perfect prediction of performance, and 1’s indicate completely inaccurate predictions of performance),
a zero-one-inflated beta regression (Zero-One-InflateD BEta ReGression; ZOIDBERG) can
be used in order to account for the 0’s and 1’s which a typical beta regression model cannot
handle. ZOIDBERG is a mixture model with three components: the exact 0’s, the exact 1’s,
and values between 0 and 1. Each component has some probability of occurring, which is
estimated by the model (Bayesian samplers can have trouble accurately exploring posterior
distributions for mixture models with non-informative priors, therefore when possible, informative priors should be used to increase the likelihood of model convergence. See [10] for
more detail). For the values between 0 and 1, a beta regression as described above is used,
while for the exact 0’s and 1’s, a likelihood with infinite density at 0 or 1 is used.
The ZOIDBERG model can be used in conjunction with or independently of the IRT model,
and exists to accurately model continuous, bounded outcomes that also contain observations
that are exactly 0 and 1. For example, a ZOIDBERG model could be used in any regression
model where brier and mBrier scores are the outcome. For example, a simple ZOIDBERG
regression model could look at–for example–whether age impacts the individual ability estimates and examine whether older adults tend to have better calibration. In contrast, a
typical beta regression will have to ignore the perfect scores or the ones that are completely
o↵. A ZOIDBERG IRT model is even more versatile, as it can also look at difficulty and discrimination of individual items as well as participant ability when the outcomes are bounded
and inclusive of 0’s and 1’s, which is typical of metamemory metrics.
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Why Bayes?

IRT models typically have a large number of parameters because even the simplest Rasch
models have at least one parameter per item, and one parameter per subject. This typically
requires large amounts of data in order to precisely estimate all of the parameters. However, many datasets that would benefit from the IRT framework, especially in experimental
psychology, are small compared to its traditional application. Bayesian analyses are a good
way to add principled information to the model (through priors), as well as a good way to
judge the precision of our estimates and whether further data is needed (through the width
of posterior distributions and credible intervals)

3.3

Section 2

In [57] a novel metamemory task was used in a Young Adults. In this task, participants were
shown twelve words one by one, and asked immediately to ”bet” on how likely they were to
remember the word when asked to recall it. The rating was on a scale of 0 to 10. Participants
were told that they would gain the points that they bet if they recalled the word, and lose
points if they did not recall the word. After seeing all twelve words, participants were asked
to recall as many words as they could. This process was repeated five times.
A Bayesian 2pl IRT model was fit to the accuracy data for each trial (whether the item
was recalled). The difficulty terms ( k ) and discrimination terms (↵k ) are based on the
word used, and the ability terms (✓n ) are based on the participant. Using an IRT model on
accuracy allows researchers to assess a) the memory ability of the participants and 2) how
difficult each item is to recall. The model produces posterior distribution for each coefficient
in the model, which are shown in Figure 3.5. Both ability scores (for each participant) and
difficulty scores (for each item) are centered around 0, which represents the average score.
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3.3.1

Person Ability

The model outputs ability scores for each person based on their overall recall performance.
Rather than taking the average accuracy across all items for each person, the ability score
weights each item di↵erently when calculating the latent ability score (a simple average
weights each item equally). This is useful when items may not be equally good at discriminating between people with di↵erent levels of ability. When this is the case, these
ability scores can allow us to get a better estimate of individuals’ latent abilities. Figure
3.4 demonstrates the di↵erence and correlation between mean accuracy (z-scored so that it
is on a similar scale) and the latent recall ability of participants from the current model.
In this sample, the latent trait scores and z-scores encode similar, but not exactly identical
information, and the di↵erence/variance may be larger in other samples with di↵erent items.
The posterior distributions for the ability scores in this sample are shown in 3.4. These scores
can be used in subsequent analyses in order to examine the e↵ects of individual di↵erences on
metamemory performance. For example, using these scores it could be possible to estimate
whether people with worse recall have better metamemory calibration (perhaps it is easier
to calibrate your metamemory if it is exceedingly clear that you cannot remember much).

3.3.2

Item Difficulty

The model also provides posterior distributions for item difficulty. Items that are more
difficult (higher difficulty values) are associated with lower probabilities of recall– especially
for people with low ability scores. Item difficulty estimates–typically represented by the
means or modes of the posterior distributions–are potentially of use to researchers who are
interested in whether e↵ects like underconfidence with practice (UWP) are a↵ected by the
difficulty of items. While UWP and similar e↵ects are currently examined on a set/group
basis, using item-level features allows researchers to examine whether the e↵ects (like UWP)
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Figure 3.4: Scatterplot of Ability Scores from the IRT model (y-axis) and z-scored mean
accuracy scores (x-axis). While there is correlation between the two scores, they are not
exactly the same as the Ability Scores weight items di↵erently. The red, dashed line shows
what a perfect 1-to-1 relationship between the two scores would look like.

are di↵erent for di↵erent items (or types of items), rather than a more generalized feature of a
group of items. For example, instead of investigating whether UWP or other MM e↵ects may
be associated with words that are predetermined to be ”difficult” or ”easy” by grouping the
e↵ects of all ”difficult” words together or all ”easy” words together, the IRT approach would
allow for each item to have a difficulty index that is estimated by participants’ performance.
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Figure 3.5: Posterior Distributions of latent trait (recall ability; right) scores for each person,
and difficulty scores for each item (left). For latent trait scores (right) positive scores indicate
above average ability, negative scores indicate below average ability. For item difficulty,
higher scores indicate that an item is more difficult to recall. The dark lines at the center of
each distribution represent the mean of the posterior distribution and are our ”best guess”
for each latent trait or difficulty score.

The item-level specificity by the posterior distribution could help elucidate the circumstances
in which an e↵ect would manifest itself. Using the UWP e↵ect as an example, it appears that
in a word-list recall, whether an UWP appears has less to do with how less confident a person
becomes, but how much better a person becomes at actual recall (see [55]). An examination
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of the pattern of UWP indicates that participants’ JOLs increased from round to round,
but the underconfidence e↵ect emerged because the increase in accuracy was sharper than
the increase in JOL. It is possible that as a list, the words become easier than one realizes.
However, item-level information may shed more light on what it is about the items that
might make it more difficult to realize that one might already be able to remember it. For
example, a researcher might be able to use an IRT model and examine how item difficulty
may be related to general underconfidence or overconfidence of JOL on specific items.
IRT models performed with accuracy (whether or not items were recalled) allow researchers
to extract nuanced information both about the recall abilities of participants, as well as the
difficulty of individual stimuli/items. These values, while not always the ultimate outcome
of metamemory analyses, can be useful because they allow researchers to quantify latent
characteristics for stimuli/items and participants for use in more detailed, full trial analyses.

3.4

Section 3

Though not traditionally utilized, IRT models have a huge amount of flexibility, and can use
individual and/or item characteristics in order to hierarchically estimate both person level
(ability) and item level (discrimination and difficulty). For example, in addition to item by
item difficulty (which only relies on the item), item characteristics such as order or other item
characteristics may also be of interest. In the dataset from Section 2, the stimuli (words)
were randomly ordered for each participant. However, due to common phenomena such as
primacy and recency e↵ects ([60]; [64], [26]), the item characteristic of the serial position
of the word, i.e. the order in which the word appears, could have a large impact on item
difficulty and discrimination. For example, because early and later items in a sequence are
often easier to remember than middle items, item difficulty may be influenced not just by
the inherent difficulty of a stimuli, but also by the order in which it’s presented. Similarly,
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discrimination could vary by order of presentation; getting a middle of the set item correct
might be a better indicator of accurate recall skills compared to the first item in the set.
Including item and person level characteristics hierarchically can extend to models with other
outcomes, too. For example, in the current task, word valence could have an e↵ect on how
difficult it is to calibrate one’s metamemory.
Person level characteristics such as age, risk propensity, temperament, education, experience
with games (for a gamitized task), or language background (for tasks in which the stimuli
are language oriented) could also be modeled hierarchically in order to assess how these
characteristics influence person ability scores for participants. For this model, a hierarchical
Bayesian 2pl model was fit to the accuracy data for each trial (whether the item was recalled).
Again, the difficulty terms ( k ) and discrimination terms (↵k ) are based on the word used,
and the ability terms (✓n ) are based on the participant. This time, the difficulty ( k ) was
modeled hierarchically as a linear combination of the unique difficulty of each word, along
with an e↵ect for word order within the list. This allows us to model whether the order in
which words were presented (1-12) within a set a↵ects the difficulty of the word.

3.4.1

Unique Word Difficulty

This model produces similar outputs to the model in Section 2 for person ability as well as
discrimination. However, it breaks word/item difficulty into two distinct parts, the first of
which is the unique difficulties for each item, which are similar to the overall difficulty values
presented in section 2.
These difficulty values can serve the same purposes mentioned in Section 2–namely to assess
how difficult each word is to recall–and can similarly be used in trial-level analyses to assess
whether word/item difficulty has an e↵ect on common e↵ects (such as UWP) that have been
observed in MM data in the past.
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Figure 3.6: Posterior Distributions of difficulty scores for each word. Positive scores indicate
above average difficulty, negative scores indicate below average difficulty. The dark lines at
the center of each distribution represent the mean of the posterior distribution and are our
”best guess” for each word’s difficulty.

3.4.2

E↵ect of Order on Difficulty

This model–in contrast to the simple model in Section 2–also provides an estimate of the
e↵ect of order on item difficulty. Because the order of words in this task was randomized,
we are able to separately estimate the e↵ect of order apart from the variation in difficulty
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due to words. Because theory supports the possibility of primacy and/or recency e↵ects, we
modeled the e↵ect of order separately for each possible position (1-12) within a set, rather
than as a linear e↵ect of order.

Figure 3.7: The posterior distributions for the e↵ect of word order. Order is shown with
earlier items at the bottom, and later items at the top of the graph. Positive scores indicate
that a word at this position will be more difficult than it otherwise would be, while negative
scores indicate that a word at this position will be less difficult than it otherwise would
be. The dark lines at the center of each distribution represent the mean of the posterior
distribution and are our ”best guess” for the e↵ect of being in that position.

The results (shown in Figure 3.7) show both primacy and recency e↵ects on recall, with
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words appearing early and late in the list having lower difficulty. This matches descriptive
statistics from the data shown in Figure 3.8. Splitting the e↵ect of difficulty into e↵ects of
order and unique difficulty due to word can help researchers get a clearer picture both of the
e↵ect of order, and also of word difficulty.

Figure 3.8: Mean Accuracy for items in position 1 through 12 in a set. Items that occur
early and later in a set are often recalled, although the primacy e↵ect seems to be stronger.

Further research should look at whether latent ability scores produced by IRT models better
predict other outcomes of interests compared to mean accuracy/brier scores. For example,
would the latent ability scores of memory (derived from IRT models on recall accuracy)
better predict participants’ metamemory, as measured by Brier scores? Conversely, would
its pattern of association with other features of interests (.e.g, participants’ risk propensity)
be more reliable than the pattern where the models did not account for item features such
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as order? In examining the primacy and recency e↵ects of a↵ective words, researchers have
found that individual di↵erences in hostility did not influence word recall for positive or
negative words ([26]). There was, however, a primacy e↵ect with negative word lists and
a recency e↵ect with positive word lists. Using the IRT models, especially one that may
account for the words’ serial positions, to examine the latent ability scores may further shed
light on whether individuals of high and low hostility truly remember positive and negative
words similarly.

3.5

Section 4

In order to demonstrate how the latent scores generated by the IRT models could be used
in further analyses, we built a Bayesian zero-one inflated beta regression model predicting
Brier scores based on the difficulty of the word/item generated by the model in Section 3,
and a random intercept for Subject.
The model shows that word difficulty has a small, negative e↵ect on brier score, indicating
that an individual’s metamemory match is slightly better for words/items that are more
difficult to recall (as lower brier scores are better), however the 89% credible interval does
overlap with 0, indicating a small probability that the e↵ect is zero, or practically equivalent
to 0. Likely, further data or more informative priors are needed to increase the precision of
the estimate for this e↵ect.
These types of analyses could also be used to look at individual di↵erences, such as looking at
a participant’s latent ability, and seeing whether their ability to recall words has a moderating
e↵ect on common e↵ects such as UWP. For example, considering the UWP appears to be
caused by a sharper increase in recall accuracy as compared with the increase in confidence
ratings, could an individual with higher latent memory ability exhibit UWP more often than
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Figure 3.9: Posterior distribution of the e↵ect of individual word difficulty from the hierarchical 2pl model in Section 3 on calibration as measured by brier scores. The light blue
shaded region represents the 89% credible interval, and the dark blue line shows the estimate
for this parameter.

an individual with a lower memory ability? Perhaps they were able to learn the words faster
than they were able to calibrate. Conversely, perhaps individuals with high memory ability
would have less room to grow, thereby becoming less likely to exhibit the UWP e↵ect. The
follow-up analyses using the latent ability scores generated by the IRT models would be
useful in further explorations of metamemory phenomena such as the UWP e↵ect.
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3.6

Section 5

The ZOIDBERG model can also be applied with an IRT model so that continuous, bounded
outcomes like mBrier,or brier can be evaluated using the IRT framework. A ZOIDBERG
2pl IRT model was fit using rStan, a package in R that provides an interface with Stan a
probabilistic programming language for statistical inference [15] . The data (di↵erent from
the data used in Sections 2-4) are from a study in which 492 participants were asked to
perform the same metamemory task as described above across 60 words split up into 5 lists.
Each list was the same Because strong order e↵ects are often observed in recall tasks, the
”items” used in this IRT analysis are the order (1-60) that a word was presented in. The
outcome was the Brier score for individual trials was predicted by item-level difficulty and
discrimination and person-level trait. In this case–because mBrier is the outcome of the
model–the person-level latent trait score refers to a person’s latent metamemory calibration,
rather than their recall ability. Because lower brier scores indicate better match (unlike
many scales where a 0 indicates a failure or poor performance), the signs of difficulty scores
were flipped so that higher scores indicate items that bias predictions toward worse brier
performance. Similarly, signs for the latent calibration trait were flipped so that higher scores
indicate participants with better latent calibration.
The latent trait scores are especially of interest, because they can give researchers a more
nuanced look at how well an individual’s JOL’s match their actual performance above and
beyond a single composite measure (such as average mBrier,or brier). This type of model
can also be expanded to include item or person-level characteristics like order, word valence,
age, or even risk propensity.
As mentioned above, this type of model can also be used to produce latent factor scores that
can help examine individual di↵erences in common e↵ects. For example, do people with
overall good metamemory match (as measured by their latent trait score from this model),
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experience UWP di↵erentially? In addition, because the ”items” in this analysis are the
order of items (words in the task are randomly assigned an order for each participant), the
latent trait scores are able to take into account di↵erences in how much information having
good metamemory calibration/match on an early, middle, or late item gives us about the
latent calibration/match of the participant in general. For example,
The results of the first model suggest that both difficulty (which, in the case of the continuous
ZOIDBERG IRT model, measures the latent trait score at which we would expect a 0.5 brier
score for that item) and discrimination (which measures the steepness of the logistic curve,
higher steepness/discrimination means that smaller di↵erences in latent trait produce more
drastically di↵erent predicted brier scores, indicating that the item is good at distinguishing
between people with di↵erent latent trait scores) di↵er across item order. For example, when
considering item order across all sixty trials, the model shows that discrimination is unusally
low in round 1 (see Figure 3.12) but seems to improve accross rounds. This suggests that
earlier items are worse at discriminating between people with di↵erent latent calibration,
perhaps because participants are often still figuring out the mechanics of the task and/or
their ability to recall items during the first round. However, discrimination is still relatively
low for all items, though many approach an acceptable level towards the end of the task. The
overall variability of discrimination scores for di↵erent item orders suggests that unweighted
averaging of calibration scores may–in many situations–ignore di↵erences in the ability of
di↵erent item orders to distinguish between participants with di↵erent latent calibration. In
other words, the latent trait scores which do take this into account could provide a more
accurate and/or nuanced measurement of an individual’s calibration.
In addition, difficulty scores also showed variation both within and across rounds. Higher
difficulty scores indicate that people tended to do worse on those items. While more data
is needed to increase the precision of the posterior estimates for these difficulty scores, some
patterns still emerged that are worth further consideration and replication. First, in the first
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round, difficulty scores–though the estimates have wide posterior distributions–tend to be
lower, indicating that compared to later rounds that have, typically higher difficulty scores,
participants with worse latent calibration are able to produce better brier scores in the first
round. This seems to be especially true for the first item in each round (1,13, 25, 37, 49; see
Figure 3.10) whose typical difficulty score starts at around -3 for the first round is greater
than -2 in the last round. This indicates that calibration on these early items is actually
more difficult with practice.
Lastly, the variation in latent calibration scores indicates that there is a lot of individual
variability between participants’ latent calibration (see Figure 3.11), information which can
be useful in other analyses such as whether established e↵ects such as UWP occur equally
across participants with di↵erent latent calibrations. The latent calibration trait scores can
be pulled directly from the model and used as a predictor in other models.

3.7

Conclusion

This paper presented four key analyses from Section 2 to Section 5. We started out with
a simple Bayesian 2pl IRT model in Section 2 on participants’ memory ability (based on
accuracy of recall in the metamemory task) and expanded the IRT model in Section 3 to
factor in the e↵ect of the serial position of the words on their difficulty. We used the item
difficulty estimates generated from the IRT model in Section 3 as a predictor of participants’
metamemory performance (as measured with Brier scores) using Bayesian zero-one-inflated
beta regression (ZOIDBERG) in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we used a ZOIDBERG 2pl
IRT model that combined the models (or distinct steps) presented separately in Sections 2-4
in one single model with a slight variation: instead of serial position on the list (1-12), we
considered the order of the words throughout the entire experiment (positions of 1-60). While
MM data is often analyzed on a set-level (i.e. trials are grouped together and analyzed), using
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Figure 3.10: Posterior distributions for Difficulty (Beta) scores from the 2pl ZOIDBERG IRT
model. Light blue shaded regions cover the 89% credible interval, while the dark blue line
indicates the center or ”best guess” for the parameter value. There is one Difficulty/Beta
score per item. Higher Difficulty/Beta scores indicate that participants are more likely, on
average, to get worse brier scores for that item.

IRT models to analyze data on the trial level can lead to deeper insights into the data, and can
facilitate analyses of item-level and person-level (individual di↵erences) characteristics. In
the example laid out in Sections 2 and 3, we see the use of the IRT models in generating latent
ability scores while also accounting for item features such as serial position. The resulting
participant memory ability scores or item difficulty scores could be used as predictors for
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Figure 3.11: A sample of posterior distributions for Latent Trait (Theta) scores from the 2pl
ZOIDBERG IRT model. Light blue shaded regions cover the 89% credible interval, while
the dark blue line indicates the center or ”best guess” for the parameter value. There is one
Trait/Theta score per participant. Lower theta/Trait scores indicate that a participant is
more likely to get worse brier scores on all items.

metamemory, as demonstrated in Section 4 to more precisely answer common questions in
MM research such as how individual di↵erences may play a role in people’s ability to predict
their own memory. While aggregating scores within each participant is common, item level
di↵erences may allow for a deeper and more detailed understanding of e↵ects. In particular,
by using the difficulty of the words extracted from the recall accuracy IRT model in Section
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Figure 3.12: Posterior distributions for the Discrimination for each item. Light blue shaded
regions cover the 89% credible interval, while the dark blue line indicates the center or
”best guess” for the parameter value. Typically, values above 0.5 are considered to have
acceptable discrimination (the gray shaded region shows the range of discrimination scores
that are traditionally considered acceptable). Items that have low discrimination do not
distinguish between participants with di↵erent abilities well.

3, the ZOIDBERG in Section 4 allowed us to examine whether words that are easier or more
difficult to remember tend to be easier to calibrate. Even though our results were inconclusive
(there was overlap in the region of practical equivalence), they still indicate a high chance
that the participants tend to have better calibration with words/items that are more difficult
to remember. Metamemory monitoring and control (see [30], [32]) could potentially explain
this finding, though the order of the two is less clear. First, participants could be exhibiting
higher metamemory monitoring when it comes to more difficult words; that is, they may have
better judgment or assessment of their own memory ability when it comes to words that are
difficult to remember (i.e., you know you are not going to remember it). This in turn could
lead to metamemory control. For example, knowing that one might not be able to remember
the word (a judgment made while monitoring the situation) may make a participant decide
to place a low JOL and devote no e↵ort to even try to remember the word. If an individual
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simply decides to ignore words that they deem too difficult to remember, a higher calibration
for these difficult words is likely. Conversely, a reverse process can also explain the potentially
higher calibration for words more difficult to remember. That is, individuals could decide
on a strategy to attempt remembering only a few words in particular, placing low bets on
all other words. Indeed, as the task gives higher points for better match between memory
prediction and actual memory (rather than memory itself), this may be the optimal strategy.
The lower accuracy on words chosen to be neglected in turn results in the higher difficulty
estimates on these words. As the process and strategy chosen may be task-dependent, future
iterations of the metamemory study could manipulate task descriptions to make participants
prioritize memory (or metamemory) to see if any di↵ering patterns of word difficulty and
calibration emerge.
As illustrated in Sections 4 and 5, Zero-One Inflated Beta Regression (ZOIDBERG) models allow researchers to properly analyze continuous, bounded outcome measures (whether
combined with IRT models or not) that are common in metamemory research. Because
ZOIDBERG models use distributions that accurately reflect the bounded nature of these
scores, not only will the models be more appropriate, but they may be less likely to produce impossible values, which is especially important when scores at the extremes (0’s and
1’s) are common. Even JOL’s which are often represented by a proportion, or probability,
can be modeled using ZOIDBERG models. These two techniques can also be combined in
order to estimate latent ability, item difficulty, and item discrimination for both outcomes
that are binary, as well as those on bounded, continuous scales. Our illustrative example in
section 5 showed that discrimination for all items increases over time, and that early items
(i.e. 1-12, the first list) largely had discrimination scores below the threshold of ”acceptable”
discrimination. This demonstrates that these early items and ratings may not be as good at
providing information about latent calibration, and should be weighted di↵erently compared
to items with better discrimination. While average scores across rounds and within rounds
can provide a baseline estimate for latent calibration, estimates of discrimination from the
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current sample suggest that di↵erential weighting may allow for a more accurate and/or
nuanced measurement of latent calibration. The di↵erential discrimination of items from
di↵erent lists could potentially explain a perplexing e↵ect known as Underconfidence with
Practice (UWP; most notably documented by [55]). The UWP e↵ect is coined to describe
metamemory performances where the participants started out fairly well calibrated, perhaps
a little overconfident (rating JOLs higher than their accuracy) with the first round of items
but became underconfident (rating JOLS became lower than their accuracy) in subsequent
rounds. Thus far, metamemory researchers have attempted to replicate the UWP e↵ect,
particularly in an e↵ort to explain it, and various theoretical constructs, including a hypothesis around internal anchors of individuals’ scale usage, have emerged (e.g., [42]; [66]; [107]).
However, our results from investigating metamemory calibration with the ZOIDBERG IRT
model o↵er an additional potential explanation: the items from the first round of the tasks
may have poorer discrimination for accurate calibration in the first place. The di↵erential
calibration in subsequent rounds may have resulted from items with better discriminatory
ability, i.e., the results may better reflect participants’ true metamemory ability. This explanation is more versatile and may perhaps also explain the findings from many studies
that failed to find and replicate the UWP e↵ect since the seminal piece from about two
decades ago; in a majority of these studies, participants actually became better calibrated
after the first round (e.g., [91], [42]). UWP or not, our finding also calls into question the
use of data from the first round of tasks. Perhaps a practice round should always be included in future metamemory tasks in an e↵ort to raise the discriminatory power of items
in the experimental phase (as opposed to practice phase) of studies. Beyond the field of
Metamemory, other areas of cognitive sciences can benefit from the use of IRT models and
ZOIDBERG models to more accurately and precisely estimate individuals’ latent abilities
of various constructs. Take working memory (WM) span measures for instance. Often, the
WM ability in these tasks are defined as the span size though partial-credit models have
been suggested that would weight the items di↵erently depending on the working memory
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load (see [22] for a discussion). The IRT model would take the WM load into account at
the level of item-difficulty. The ZOIDBERG models would also be able to account for the
distribution of item correctness beyond a simple 0 for incorrect and 1 for correct items. The
resulting latent ability scores may not only account for extraneous item features (e.g., order
e↵ect due to fatigue) but also make the ability scores more comparable across di↵erent types
of WM measures.
All in all, the IRT models with or without ZOIDBERG hold potential for cognitive scientists–
whether it is in metamemory or beyond– to further explore and expand their research. IRT
models are one tool that allow for weighted estimates of latent traits, and also allow for
item level analyses which can help elucidate when and for whom (individual-di↵erences)
certain e↵ects are strongest. In addition, when taking unweighted sums or averages across
items, researchers are inherently assuming that all items should be weighted equally, the IRT
framework allows for that assumption to be tested and adjusted if needed. The ZOIDBERG
model also allows for appropriate estimation of continuous but bounded variables, such as
brier or proportions, that are common to cognitive measures. We hope this paper proves
useful to the examination of various constructs relating to IRT and ZOIDBERG models and
their potential applications in metamemory research (specifically) and cognitive measures
(in general).
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Chapter 4
A Hierarchical Bayesian IRT Analysis
of Childrens Risk Propensity

Abstract
The Children’s Risk Utility Measure (CRUM) is an interactive, modified version of the
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) that is appropriate for young children. This paper
utilizes a Bayesian IRT model (an extension of logistic regression) to examine the impact of
subject-level characteristics (age, working memory, inhibitory control) and trial-level characteristics (e.g. block, order,etc.) on the performance of children ages 3-6 years on the CRUM.
The Bayesian model is especially helpful when performing IRT models–which have many
parameters–on small data sets. The order of the trials was not associated with lower difficulty, indicating that children’s performance remained steady as the task went on. Working
memory performance was negatively associated with children’s latent CRUM performance,
while high scores on an inhibitory control task were positively related to child’s latent CRUM
performance. Age and the interaction of age with working memory performance were both
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negligible e↵ects. The IRT model was an e↵ective way to estimate latent CRUM performance.

4.1

Introduction

Children are notoriously fearless; running across slippery grass, eating bugs, and climbing up
to the tops of trees while their anxious parents scream at them to get down. Research on the
development of risk propensity suggests that as we get older, we become more cautious [68].
However, there is little research on what risk preferences look like within the preschool age
range. Understanding individual di↵erences in risk aversion from a young age might provide
clues on individual di↵erences in risk propensity in adulthood. Is age the sole driver of
risk preferences? Does executive function play a role? There are few laboratory procedures
that assess young children’s risk-taking preferences, so these questions have gone largely
unanswered.
A standard measure of risk aversion of adults is the Iowa Gambling Task in which participants
are presented with four decks of cards with di↵erent, unknown levels of reward. Participants
are instructed to draw from the decks to maximize their reward. In [50], Kerr and Zalazo
made a simplified version of this task. Authors found that 3-year-olds chose more from
the deck that had higher gains, but larger losses, than from the deck that had lower gains
but lower losses. Similarly, [106] had participants ages 5-85 years complete a computerized
version of The Cups task, where participants have to choose between a sure bet or a risky
gamble to win money. They found that younger children had riskier performance on this
task, and that risk aversion increased throughout development. However, a limitation of
these studies is that they both use two-alternative forced-choice tasks. In order to see
individual di↵erences in risk propensity, a more dynamic task is needed.
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An example of a dynamic measure is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), which is
often used to assess an adult’s propensity for risk [56]. In this virtual task, participants
press a button to pump air into a balloon. A participant’s earnings are proportional to the
size of the balloon, so there is incentive to pump as much air into the balloon as possible.
However, as the balloon gets larger, the likelihood of the balloon popping increases. If the
balloon pops, the participant loses everything from that trial. Riskier performance on the
BART has been linked to real-world risky behaviors including smoking and drug use [56].
Given children’s well-documented difficulties tracking numerosities higher than three [34],
the current version of the BART task may be too abstract for many preschool-age children
children.
The Child Risk Utility Measure (CRUM) is a dynamic, preschool-friendly measure of risk
propensity that respects the cognitive limitations of three-to-six-year-old children [95]. Ordinarily, risk propensity would be measured by adding up all the successful clicks a child
made, divided by all the potential clicks they could have made (potential clicks were drawn
randomly based on latent probabilities at each step, and were randomly assigned to each
child; See Methods). The use of an IRT model allows for a di↵erential weighting of each
item in the task, which is a more nuanced way of measuring the latent risk propensity of
children. Clearer measures of risk propensity can help distinguish individual di↵erences.
Thus, any measure that accounts for more item-level variability can improve our accuracy
in estimating risk propensity. The current paper uses a Hierarchical Bayesian IRT model to
assess predictors of preschoolers’ performance on the CRUM.

4.2

Methods

The Bayesian Item Response Theory (IRT) model looks at item and person/child-level parameters separately. Item-level parameters are framed in terms of difficulty: a positive
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relationship with difficulty indicates that a child is less likely to be successful in a trial involving that item. Conversely, child-level parameters are framed in terms of ability (in this
case, the IRT-related concept of ability refers to latent performance on the CRUM task.) A
positive relationship with ability indicates that a child is more likely to be successful in a
trial, compared to children with lower latent ability for this task. In addition to the benefits
that come from modeling these concepts separately, the IRT model allows for trial-level data
to be analyzed, rather than task-level summaries.

4.2.1

Data

Fifty-nine three- to six-year- old children were tested at preschools throughout Orange
County, CA (Range: 36.6 - 73 months, average: 53.98 months). Researchers visited the
children two separate times. During one visit, children would complete the CRUM task.
During the other visit, children completed the Dogs and Monkeys (an inhibitory control
task) and TouchBase (a working memory task). The task order was randomly assigned.

CRUM

Children were seated at a table with a plate and a tablet directly in front of them. The
experimenter sat to the left of the participant and explained that they were going to play a
game called “Sneaky Cookies“ where they would be able to win stickers. The experimenter
demonstrated the game first and said: “In this game, Cookie Monster tries to take cookies
from the cookie jar without Oscar catching him. When Oscar is far away, it is harder for him
to catch us. For every cookie Cookie Monster gets, you get a sticker. You can click the cookie
jar to try and get another sticker, or click the plate to keep the stickers.” The experimenter
played three trials, and showed children both a win and a loss. The experimenter asked the
child “If I want another sticker, what should I click on?” and “If I want to keep my stickers,
74

what should I click on?”
Each time the child took a cookie without being caught, the experimenter placed a sticker on
the plate in front of the child, and said “N cookies, N stickers!” This made the reward less
abstract to the child, and reduced the amount of e↵ort they needed to link their performance
to the reward because it removed the step of remembering that each cookie collected is
equivalent to a sticker. When the child clicked on the plate to collect the stickers, the
experimenter said, “You won N stickers!” The stickers were then put into an envelope for
the child to take home. If Oscar woke up, the experimenter said, “Oh no, Oscar caught you!”
and dumped the stickers into a box that was out of the child’s sight and reach indicating
that the child would not receive those stickers. In each trial, the risk of getting caught by
Oscar increased as the number of cookie increases as the number of cookies increased (0/9,
1/9, 2/9,..., 9/9). For example, if the plate had two cookies on it, the chance that Oscar will
catch Cookie Monster would be 2/9. As a visual cue to the increasing risk, the garbage can
moved closer to the table each time a cookie was taken from the jar. Subjects completed
two blocks of 9 trials for a total of 18 trials. Whether or not the child would be caught
was predetermined using a random number generator at each potential click. This give us
18 trials total, each with a maximum number of clicks before getting caught. Trials were
presented in a random order for each participant.

Dogs and Monkeys

Dogs & Monkeys is an executive function measure that evaluates inhibitory control [73].
The task measures how well children can perform while switching between frameworks with
di↵erent rules. The objective of Dogs & Monkeys is to press a button in response to seeing
a stimulus on the screen (either a dog or a monkey). Children won stickers for playing the
game and all children received five stickers for completing the task, no matter how they
performed. There were six alternating practice and game trials: the Dog practice, the Dog
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Figure 4.1: Design of the CRUM task.

game; the Monkey practice, the Monkey game; the Dogs & Monkeys practice, and the Dogs
& Monkeys game. In practice trials, children received feedback on their performance and
were asked to redo the practice if the experimenter did not believe that they understood the
objective.
For the individual Dog game and Monkey game, there were a total of 12 trials, with 6 of the
stimuli appearing on the left and 6 on the right. In the Dogs and Monkeys game, there was
a total of 48 trials, with 24 dogs (12 appearing on the left, 12 on the right) and 24 monkeys
(12 appearing on the left, 12 on the right). The Dogs game (i.e., congruent trials) required
the child to press the button on the same side of the screen as the stimulus. For the Dog
trials, the experimenter told the child, ”The dog is very friendly and wants to play with
you. To play with the dog, you are going to press the button that is on the SAME side as
the dog.” The experimenter explained the monkey game to the participant by saying, ”The
monkey is silly, and he does everything opposite, so watch out! You are going to press the
button that is on the OPPOSITE side of the monkey!” Warm-up trials were used to make
sure that the child understood how to do the incongruent (Monkey) trials. Similar to the
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stickers/cookies paradigm in the CRUM, the descriptions of the animals were intended to
make it easier for the child to remember the two rules (dog-same, monkey-opposite) thus
reducing the amount of e↵ort the child needed to remember the rule and potentially give a
clearer measure of inhibitory control.
After completing the congruent (Dog) and incongruent (Monkey) warm-up trials separately,
the child began the Dogs & Monkeys trials, in which they were instructed to press the
appropriate button in sets where both dogs and monkeys would appear (i.e., congruent
and incongruent trials were mixed). This forced the children to switch between the two
established rules to be successful. If they perseverated on one rule (same side, or opposite
side) they would not be successful. In these trials, the children had to inhibit the nonapplicable rule. Performance on the task was determined by the child’s mean accuracy on
the switch trials.
A switch trial indicates that the rule for the n

1th trial was di↵erent than the rule for the

current, nth , trial. For example if a child saw a monkey on the n

1th trial, and a dog on

the nth trial, the nth trial is considered a switch trial.

TouchBase

TouchBase measures working-memory capacity in children [73]. Working memory (WM)
refers to “the temporary storage of information in connection with the performance of other
cognitive tasks” [5]. TouchBase is a WM span task that measures the ability to recall spatial
positions in order. In this particular task, children were asked to remember the order of the
bases from which a green alien emerged from, after he had disappeared. The experimenter
introduced the game as a “mission” in which the child took up the role of a secret agent
to click on the order of bases that the alien came out from after he disappears. The game
had two practice rounds, in which the experimenter provided the child with feedback and
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repeated the rules of the game if necessary. In these rounds, the alien only appeared twice,
measuring the children’s ability to recall a 2 locations. In the real game, the number of
bases increased every two rounds up to a total of nine bases. After two consecutive incorrect
answers, the game came to an end. The task ended if a child gave incorrect responses
for the same span twice in a row (i.e. if they failed to complete two 4-base trials in a row).
Performance for TouchBase was measured by the highest number of bases accurately recalled
in order, representing WM.

4.2.2

Analysis

A Bayesian 2pl IRT model was run using R 4.0.0 [72] and Stan through the rstan package
[16]. The item-level difficulty parameters (

n)

were modeled hierarchically and depended on

the block of trials the item occurred in (1 or 2) and on the order the trial was presented
to the participant. Participants were randomly assigned to get Block 1 or Block 2 first.
Similarly, the person-level parameters (✓k ) were modeled hierarchically and depended on a
participant’s age in months, their overall digit span, the interaction between digit span and
age, and their inhibitory control (as measured by mean accuracy on the Dogs & Monkeys
task). The model is represented graphically in Fig 4.2.
In the 2pl IRT model, the probability of having a successful CRUM trial (in other words,
the child was able to finish the trial before getting “caught“ and losing their progress) is
modeled by the following function:

P (ynk

e↵n (✓k n )
= 1|✓k , n , ↵n ) =
1 + e↵n (✓k n )

The model is similar to a typical logistic regression model with the added multiplication by
the discrimination parameter, ↵n . ↵n indicates the steepness of the logistic function for each
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item. Items with greater steepness are better at discriminating between persons who are
at di↵erent ability levels because the steeper the function, the smaller change in ability is
required for the model to go from a prediction of 0 to a prediction of 1. Similarly, the

n

parameters indicate the difficulty of each item. Items that have a high difficulty decrease the
probability that a person will have a successful trial. The ✓k parameters represent the latent
ability for each person in the model. Unlike composite scores that use unweighted sums or
averages to combine multiple trials into one score per person, the 2pl model creates a factor
score which weights trials di↵erentially based on how well the items distinguish between
persons with di↵erent underlying abilities. This creates a more nuanced measure of latent
inhibitory control for each person.
The prior distributions for the item difficulty (

n)

and person ability (✓k ) parameters were

set to a normal distribution with a mean of 0, and a standard deviation of 2. While these
priors are di↵use, they reflect the typical range of both latent ability and item difficulty and
therefore place sufficiently low prior density on values that are unreasonable in this context.
For the same reason, the priors for all model coefficients were set to a normal distribution
with a mean of 0, and a standard deviation of 2. The prior distribution for the discrimination
(↵n ) parameters was set to a log normal distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a variance of
1. This restricts the value of the ↵n parameters to be greater than 0, which is appropriate
because negative values for the ↵n parameters would indicate a “reverse coded“ trial (e.g. a
trial in which difficulty increased and ability decreased the probability of having a successful
trial).
The model was run using 4 chains of 10,000 iterations each (2,000 warmup iterations, and
8,000 sample iterations). For each parameter, a combination of an R-hat  1.1 and a e↵ective
sample size (n e↵)

400 was considered acceptable for convergence. The R-hat metric is

a ratio of the between and within chain variance and measures how well the 4 chains (each
split in half) mix. In other words, it measures whether the chains have converged and
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ynk
k 2 {1, . . . , K}
n

⌘nn
↵

block order wm

n 2 {1, . . . , N }
✓k

ic

age

✓k ⇠ N ormal(0, 2)
n ⇠ N ormal(0, 2)
↵k ⇠ lognormal(0.5, 1)
block ⇠ N ormal(0, 2)
order ⇠ N ormal(0, 2)
wm ⇠ N ormal(0, 2)
wm : age ⇠ N ormal(0, 2)
ic ⇠ N ormal(0, 2)
age ⇠ N ormal(0, 2)
Figure 4.2: Graphical Representation of the model. Dashed circles represent unobserved
parameters. Solid circles represent observed data.
are exploring the space similarly and efficiently. The e↵ective sample size measures the
amount by which the auto-correlation in the samples increases the uncertainty relative to an
independent sample. Higher e↵ective sample size indicates more independent information
from the samples drawn.
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4.3
4.3.1

Results
Item-level parameters

An interesting pattern emerged in the item-level parameters. Our results revealed that there
was no e↵ect of order on difficulty. In other words, children’s performance across the task
remained steady (0[-0.02,0.03]). The analysis also reveals that Block 2 tended to be more
difficult than Block 1 (the order of the blocks was counterbalanced; 0.21[0.06,0.37]).

Figure 4.3: Posterior distributions for each e↵ect.

4.3.2

Person-level parameters

The working memory span (as measured by the TouchBase task) had a negative relationship
with probability of successful trial (-0.21[-0.4,-0.03]). This suggests that children with poorer
working memory might be more likely to avoid taking risks, therefore less likely to get caught
by Oscar. Inhibitory control (as measured through the Dogs & Monkeys task), on the other
hand, had a positive relationship with the probability of a successful trial (0.48[0.02,0.95]),
suggesting that the higher a child scored on the inhibitory control task, the more likely they
were to have a successful trial. This is likely because a child needs a high rate of inhibitory
control in order to stop the trial before they’ve been caught.
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Age and the interaction between age and working memory span both had a near zero e↵ects
(age: 0[0,0.01], wm:age 0[0,0.01]).

Figure 4.4: The posterior distributions for the difficulty for each item. Items were given in
a random order to each participant. Most items had an estimated difficulty between 0 and
1. Higher difficulty scores indicate items that have a lower probability of success.

4.3.3

Person ability scores

The model also generated latent CRUM ability scores for each child. A score of 0 (see
Fig 4.5) represents average ability, while scores above and below represent better than and
less than average performance respectively. These ability scores are more nuanced than
simple averages of items across the task, because items are weighted deferentially depending
on their ability to discriminate between people with di↵erent latent ability scores.
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Figure 4.5: The posterior distributions for each person’s estimated ability score. A score of 0
indicates an “average” or typical score. Positive scores indicate above average performance.
Similarly, negative scores indicate below average performance. The shape of each distribution
shows the relative likelihood of potential ability scores for that person.

4.4

Conclusion

Risk propensity and executive functioning (EF) impacts many areas of student learning both
inside and outside the classroom [9], and therefore an accurate measure of EF in children is
useful for developmental research and educational practice. As we see a shift in the amount
of education that is done remotely, it is even more important to actively seek out children
who might benefit from tailored educational plans based on their executive functioning.
Crucially, we found that there are individual di↵erences in the way preschool-aged children
take risks 4.5. This is one of the first studies to show that children of this age group have
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individual di↵erences when approaching risky decisions. There is some work suggesting that
as we get older, we take fewer risks [68]. However, this work only looks at aggregate-level
data. Using this approach allows us to examine individual, trial-level data. This is an
important finding because these di↵erences could be stable across the lifespan. Future work
can look into the stability of these latent parameters over time.
Additionally, we found that age did not account for the individual di↵erences in risk propensity we observed in CRUM. Other factors such as performance on the EF measures (inhibitory control and working memory) served as better predictors of performance on the
CRUM. Specifically, we found that worse performance on the working memory measure was
related to better latent ability on the task. This could be explained by children who have
worse working memory wanting to play it safer and clicking on the plate at earlier times,
thus having more success on the task. Children with better performance on the inhibitory
control measure also had better performance on the CRUM. This could be explained by
children that have better inhibitory control could be better able to click on the plate and
collect their rewards before getting caught.
IRT models are already prevalent in the psychometric/standardized testing portions of educational research, but their usefulness extends far beyond that. IRT models allow us to
calculate a di↵erentially weighted latent ability score for each child, which gives us a more
nuanced look at the child’s true risk propensity. They also allow for trial/item-level e↵ects
and person-level e↵ects (such as individual di↵erences factors) to be modeled separately
before combining them in the main model. Bayesian IRT models are particularly useful
because they allow prior expertise and information to be included in the model. By their
nature, IRT models have many parameters that need to be estimated. Education data sets
from early childhood based classroom studies are sometimes difficult to collect and are can
be smaller in size. This presents a struggle for typical IRT models because there may not
be enough data points to accurately estimate all of the parameters. By allowing two sepa-
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rate streams of information (the prior, and the data), the Bayesian IRT model can at least
partially overcome this difficulty (though posteriors may be di↵use if there is a lack of information or high variability in the data). It is also important that researchers are not taking
up children’s educational time unnecessarily. By using well supported and reasonable priors
in the Bayesian analyses, it is possible in many cases to attain high levels of precision with
less data and therefore less interruption of children’s educational time. This type of analysis
is therefore useful both for its direct benefits as well as for the way it overcomes sample size
issues.
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Chapter 5
Betting the Farm: The Interaction
between Judgement of Learning
Framework and Behavioral Inhibition
and Approach/Avoidance

Abstract
Metamemory (MM) tasks aim to provide a more objective measure of metamemory compared
to self-report measures. Frequently, users are asked to provide a judgment of learning (JOL)
that indicates their belief about their ability to recall or recognize items. In a time where
gamification is often used in order to maintain user engagement during cognitive tasks,
framing JOLs as ”bets” is one possible way to gamify metamemory tasks. This study looked
at how JOL framing (betting vs prediction of recall) a↵ects JOL usage and how Behavioral
Inhibition and Approach/Avoidance (measured with the BIS/BAS scale) moderates that
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relationship. We found noteable di↵erences in the way that people utilized the ordinal (010) bet/JOL scale when the task was framed as a betting task versus when it was framed
as an explicit JOL. We also found clear e↵ects of BAS Reward Responsiveness and BAS
Drive on calibration (measured by Brier scores), and significant di↵erences in these e↵ects
for the two Frameworks. Framing the task as an explicit JOL rather than a bet reduced if
not totally removed the relationship between the two BAS subscales and calibration.

5.1

Introduction

Metamemory is defined as the ”individual’s knowledge of and awareness of memory” (Flavell
et al., 1975). Metamemory has traditionally been assessed through self-report measures (such
as the Metamemory in Adulthood questionnaire), which can be confounded with the salience
of recent memory-related experiences. For example in Jaeggi et. al, Older Adults participating in a cognitive training task actually rated their memories worse after training than
before despite only a few weeks passing between ratings ([89]). The authors hypothesized
that the fact that participants had had many recent observations of their memory failing
(during the difficult cognitive training task), their poor memory was more salient than during
their first rating before the experience. Objective measures of metamemory such as those
from [67], [48], [42], and [108] (as well as many others not cited here) attempt to ameliorate
some of those confounds associated with self-report. In metamemory tasks, participants are
typically asked to give a judgment of learning (JOL), to indicate how likely they think it is
that they will remember certain items or information. These JOLs are then compared to
actual recall/recognition and the resulting di↵erence will then provide/used as an estimate
of meta-memory performance.
Metamemory tasks, such as the one used in this paper, can be gamified by framing the JOLs
as ”bets”, as demonstrated in [67] and [48] where participants are asked to place a bet on
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whether or not they are likely to remember items, rather than explicitly asking for a JOL
(e.g. ”How likely are you to remember this word?”). Researchers have increasingly relied on
gamified tasks in order to increase participant engagement, although evidence for whether
gamification actually boosts engagement for cognitive tasks is mixed ([58]). Gamifying tasks,
including the metamemory task, may a↵ect the way that participants contextualize and
respond to the task. In [67], we introduced the modified Brier score (mBrier) as a way
to account for di↵erent scale usage between individuals in this type of gamified ”betting”
task. For example, we hypothesized that individuals with lower risk propensity may not
use the full betting scale (0-10) when JOLs were framed as ”bets,” which carry more of a
connotation of risk than a JOL. While BAS Reward and BAS Fun had small, but notable
e↵ects on average bets, BIS and BAS Drive had negligible e↵ects, however the e↵ects of
BIS/BAS may be better studied by looking at their e↵ect on the variance of bets/JOLs.
The present study also aims to extend previous work in this domain by explicitly testing
whether the framing of the task (betting vs. JOL) and individual risk propensity a↵ect
metamemory calibration and match. If the gamified framing a↵ects metamemory calibration,
then gamification should be carefully considered when implementing these objective measures
of metamemory. If risk propensity has an overall e↵ect on metamemory calibration, the
framing of the task might not matter much. However, if metamemory is context-dependent,
i.e., the context of betting or explicitly giving a confidence rating, then individual di↵erences
factors that may influence performance in such contexts should be explored.

5.1.1

Objective Metamemory tasks

While MM has been traditionally measured using self-report measures such as the Metamemory in Adulthood (MIA) Questionnaire, the Multifactorial MM Questionnaire (MMQ), and
the Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ), objective measures of metamemory in which
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participants are asked to predict their MM performance and are then explicitly tested on
their performance has also been of interest to researchers.
The task used in the current paper is based on a memory task by Castel et. al in which
participants were shown lists of 12 words, one at a time ([19]). Each word was given a
random score, 1-12, and participants were told to try to remember the words with the
largest score. After 12 words were presented, participants were asked to recall as many
words as they could remember. The current adaptation, first used in ([67] and [48]) has a
similar structure, but participants are allowed to give their own score (0-10) for each word so
that their metamemory (how they think about their own memory ability) can be measured
and compared to their actual performance.

5.1.2

Gamification

In recent decades, there is increasing interest in ”gamifying” assessment and learning experiences. Gamification usually consists of the addition of game elements and other features
to make the original task or system more game-like and playful has become popular for
motivational reasons (e.g., [69]; [74]; [88]). The gamification framework typically touts the
benefits of game qualities that would engage the player in an otherwise dull task. In education and learning environments, scholars have supported this notion using self-determination
theory ([24]) or the Universal Design for Learning framework ([79? ]; [80]) (see [88]). Indeed, recent meta-analyses on gamification of learning or assessment systems have generally
found a positive trend of adding game elements when it comes to cognitive outcomes ([41];
[82]). However, researchers also cautioned that gamification is not universally e↵ective and
that the positive e↵ects are dependent on the context as well as the characteristics of the
players ([41]; [74]). Furthermore, counterproductive side e↵ects have also been found, for
example, where certain game features end up rewarding players for unintended behaviors or
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decreasing players’ intrinsic motivation ([4]; [28]). Considering that the gamification could
potentially engage participants but that the context in which it happens could a↵ect the
outcome, along with participants’ individual characteristics, further research into both, the
role of gamification and individual di↵erences is warranted.

5.1.3

Anchoring and a Betting Framework

Previous theories suggest that JOLs may be interpreted as strict probability, in which a JOL
on a percentage scale (0-100%) represents the belief that items with an X% rating will be
recalled X% of the time (e.g. 40% of words given a 40% JOL would be recalled in the long
run) ([42]). On the other hand, a less strict confidence interpretation only specifies that
items with higher JOLs will be remembered more often than those with lower JOLs ([42]).
[85] discuss the anchoring hypothesis in which percentage based JOLs are ”anchored” to a
particular value and JOLs are pulled toward that anchor rather than taking on the value
they would otherwise be without reference to said anchor. Previous research has suggested
that participants anchor their JOLs from a 50% value connor1997age, while another study
found that participants were anchoring from 30% [84]. [85] state that ”the anchor may stem
at least partly from previous learning experiences, and its precise location may depend on
the particular circumstances”, indicating that it is possible that anchors also rely on the
framework the JOL is presented in (as well as other characteristics).
For example, the re-framing of JOLs as bets may motivate participants to behave di↵erently
than they otherwise would. Research already suggests that there are di↵erences in observed
e↵ects such as underconfidence with practice (UWP) that appear in percentage based JOLs,
but not in binary JOLs([42], [108]), further indicating that the framing and context of the
JOL a↵ects their use. Those studies also found that participants were able to accurately
assess future recall using the binary betting decision (compared to a continuous JOL, such
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as 0%-100%, or ordinal JOL, such as 0-10 scale). [42] also looked at whether there were
di↵erences in calibration as a function of the presented context (JOL vs. bet) that the MM
task is presented in. In their task, participants were shown items and either asked to bet
on whether they’d remember the word (if they placed a bet, they would gain 1 point if they
recalled the item, and lose 1 point if they did not; if they did not place a bet, they would
not earn nor lose any points), or to give a JOL (1 if they thought they’d recall the item,
0 if they did not). Similar patterns of results were found in their analyses of the di↵erence
between recall performance and proportion of items that participants indicated they would
remember (either through a bet of 1 point, or a binary JOL), although an explicit statistical
comparison between the two was not performed.
In addition to investigating whether there might be systematic di↵erences associated with
the context and framing of the JOL, the present study seeks to analyze whether there are
individual di↵erences in scale usage between participants. Examining and accounting for
individual variability may also help clarify and strengthen evidence for observed systematic
di↵erences due to JOL framing.

5.1.4

Risk Propensity

In addition to context, individual factors may influence how participants use the JOL scale.
Taking risks, defined by the Webster dictionary as ”the possibility of harm or injury,” is part
of everyday life. Say Chelsea went to a cafe and saw a new item on the menu. Whether she
decides to try it or not depends in part on her risk propensity, or ”the tendency of the decision
maker either to take or avoid risks ” ([90]). Although riskiness may be situational–running a
red light in a busy intersection clearly incurs more risk than failing to stop at a stop-signr–
researchers have found a general risk-taking factor that may explain individuals’ risk taking
or risk aversive behaviors across di↵erent contexts ([38]; [47]). Examining a measure meant
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to assess domain-specific risk taking behavior (the DOSPERT; [12]), researchers found that
a bi-factor model that includes a general risk taking factor along with other specific factors
to be a better fit than the original five-factor model. Additionally, the general risk-taking
factor explains certain outcomes (i.e., counterproductivity) better than specific factors do
([47]). In short, while it appears that people’s risk behaviors may depend on the context, the
decision to avoid or take the risk may also depend on the individual’s general risk propensity.
That is, if Chelsea is risk taking enough to try a new drink at the cafe, she may also be likely
to ride her bike in new terrain. In the anchoring hypothesis, it’s possible that individual
di↵erences including risk propensity could a↵ect the anchor value for individual participants.

5.1.5

Behavioral Inhibition and Approach/Avoidance

Individual di↵erences in risk propensity has been further conceptualized and explained using
a dual motivational systems theory, one that is sensitive to rewards (the appetitive system,
or the behavioral approach system, BAS) and the other to negative stimuli (the aversive
system, or the behavioral inhibition system, BIS) ([103]). Those characteristics have been
captured using self-report BIS/BAS scales (e.g. [17]), demonstrating how behavioral approach and inhibition are related to risk-taking decisions either in laboratory settings or real
life situations.
Research using gambling tasks has shown that sensitivity to risk, and the related motivation
systems of Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and the Behavioral Approach (Avoidance)
System (BAS), are associated with performance on gambling and risk taking tasks such as
the Iowa Gambling Task ([51], [94], [40], [17]). [102] found that those who were high in
BAS but low in BIS (determined by discarding participants who were within 3 points of
the median scores) performed worse on the Iowa Gambling task compared to those who
were low in BAS and high on BIS. Relatedly, [40] found that in both normal controls, as
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well as pathological gamblers, BIS and BAS were associated with performance on the Iowa
Gambling Task. Participants low on BIS and low on BAS performed better than low/high
and high/high BIS/BAS participants, with no significant di↵erence in the e↵ect between
pathological gamblers and normal controls. In [94], high BIS scores tend to lead individuals
to avoid risking situations/potential losses, whereas high BAS scores tend to lead individuals
to take risks.
The relation is found using gambling tasks besides IGT as well. For example, using the
Cognitive-A↵ective Slot Experiments (CASE), researchers were able to adjust the paradigm
so participants could either adjust their wager (W-game version) or the probability of winning
(P-game version). In both versions, low BIS/BAS ratio and low BIS scores are found to be
related to more risk-taking behaviors, whereas individuals with higher BAS scores are found
to place higher bets ([25]). This finding is consistent with other research on how individuals’
inhibition or approach tendencies are likely to influence their betting behavior.
BIS/BAS scores have been found to be predictive of real-life behaviors ([103]). For example,
in surveys of over 1000 undergraduate students in universities across multiple states, BAS
had positive association with risky behavior. Surprisingly, so did BIS. Higher BIS scores were
associated with risky behaviors such as poor diet, unsafe acts, lack of physical activity, and
drug use ([103]). The researchers provided few explanations for the surprising BIS finding,
suggesting that perhaps higher BIS scores may be indicative of anxiety, which is in turn
related to, for example, poor diet. Perhaps that examining BIS or BAS alone with the
external measures do not paint the whole picture.
While the BIS construct is presumed to be unidimensional, the BAS construct–as typically
measured by Carver and White’s BIS/BAS scales–has three separate factors: Fun Seeking
(how persistent one is in pursuing goals [98])), Drive (how much one seeks out rewards on
impulsively [98])), and Reward Responsiveness (the degree to which one experiences positive
responses to or anticipations of rewards [98]) which may have slightly di↵erent e↵ects on
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behavior ([17]). For example, [102] found that were high in BAS but low in BIS (determined
by discarding participants who were within 3 points of the median scores) performed worse
on the Iowa Gambling task compared to those who were low in BAS and high on BIS. BIS
and BAS are presumed to be orthogonal, meaning that all di↵erent combinations of BIS/BAS
levels should exist ([17]). [94] found that individuals with especially high BAS Fun-Seeking
scores (compared to those with low overall BAS scores and those who were only high on
Drive and Reward Responsiveness) performed poorly on the Iowa Gambling Task.
As the BIS/BAS scale seem to be highly indicative of risk taking behaviors in gambling situations, it may be a useful tool to uncover whether reframing and gamifying a metamemory
task by turning the JOL into a ”bet” will draw out di↵erential risk taking responses among
individuals who may be thrill seekers or avoidant (as determined by BIS/BAS). If changing
the framing of the metamemory task a↵ects the pattern or range of JOLs, then it is possible
that such tasks are measuring slightly di↵erent concepts than non-gamified JOLs. Specifically, we hypothesize that high BIS/low BAS scores will moderate the JOL scale usage (in
terms of range of scale used, and patterns of response) and that this e↵ect will be more
pronounced when JOL’s are framed as ”bets” than when they are framed as JOLs.
Reframing and gamifying the metamemory task by turning the JOL into a ”bet” may accomplish similar goals (i.e. prompt participants to make an assessment about whether they
will recall items), but could have an impact on how participants will treat the JOL/bet scale.
Anecdotally, in a di↵erent study ([48]) the researchers observed a participant who refused
to participate in the metamemory task, citing a concern over gambling, which spawned the
research questions surrounding this study. If changing the framing of the metamemory task
a↵ects the pattern or range of JOLs, then it is possible that such tasks are measuring slightly
di↵erent concepts than non-gamified JOLs. Specifically, we hypothesize that high BIS/low
BAS scores will moderate the JOL scale usage (in terms of range of scale used, and patterns
of response) and that this e↵ect will be more pronounced when JOL’s are framed to the
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participants as ”bets” than when they are framed as JOLs, due to the salience of the riskier
framing of the bet.

5.2

Methods

509 participants were recruited over the course of six weeks through the website, Prolific.
Participants were paid $5 for the completion of the study. Only participants who were
fluent in English were allowed to participate. The experiment consisted of two tasks: the
metamemory task, and the BIS/BAS survey (administered in random/counterbalanced order) and was estimated to take 20-30 minutes (average time: 998.37, range: 354.62-4477.82).
Seventeen participants were excluded. Reasons for exclusion were: incorrect entry of recalled
words in the MM task resulting in incorrect performance feedback (1), data files not stored
on the server (8), failed attention check (3), and missing a bet/JOL for more than 10% of
trials (5; 10% of trials is 6 JOLs/bets out of 60).

5.2.1

MetaMemory Task

In this task, participants completed five rounds which each round consisted of twelve words.
The order of the words were randomized within round (i.e. each person saw the same twelve
words for round 1, but the order the words were presented in was randomly chosen). Each
word was shown for 2 seconds, then a prompt popped up to ask for a bet or JOL. Participants
in the Betting Framework condition were given the instructions ”In this task you will see
words presented one by one. Your job is to remember these words. After you see a word,
you will place a ”bet” (on a scale of 0-10) on how likely you are to remember that word
when we ask you to recall it. If you remember the word, you will GAIN the amount of points
you bet. If you do not remember the word you will LOSE the number of points you bet,
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and I remembered the word, I would get 7 points added to my score. If I did not remember
”butterfly”, I would get 7 points subtracted from my score. You will be shown a score after
each round, indicating how well you did. A higher score indicates better performance. Do
not use any outside help (such as typing or writing the words down)”.
While the participants in the JOL Framework were given the instructions ”In this task you
will see words presented one by one. Your job is to remember these words. After you see a
word, you will be asked how likely you are to remember that word (on a scale 0-10) when we
ask you to recall it. 0 indicates that you are absolutely confident that you will NOT remember
the word, and 10 indicates that you are absolutely confident you will remember the word. Try
to predict your performance as accurately as possible. You will be shown a score after each
round, indicating how well you did. A higher score indicates better performance. Do not use
any outside help (such as typing or writing the words down)” (di↵erences in the instructions
shown in italics).
Participants could choose an integer (0-10) for the bet/JOL by clicking on the corresponding
button. In order to prevent participants from pausing the task to rehearse excessively, if a
bet was not placed after 10 seconds, the task moved on to the next word and both recorded
the bet as 0 for scoring purposes, and flagged the trial as missing a bet. Although missing
bets/JOLs is not ideal, it was deemed acceptable in order to prevent excessive di↵erences in
rehearsal time between participants and to prevent participants from going o↵ task for too
long (e.g. clicking to another tab, or checking their phone) during the bet/JOL portion of the
task. In addition, the Bayesian and Mixed E↵ects models used in the analysis help alleviate
issues caused by missing values (see Data Summary Section for more detail on missingness of
bet/JOL). After all twelve words were seen and the corresponding bets/JOLs were collected,
participants were asked to type the words they could recall from the preceding list (words
recalled from other previous lists were not counted as correct). This process was repeated
once for each of the five rounds.
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Table 5.1: Exemplars for BIS/BAS Survey.
BIS
BAS Reward
Responsiveness
BAS Drive
BAS Fun Seeking

5.2.2

Example Item
”I worry about making mistakes.”
”When good things happen to me, it a↵ects me strongly.”
”I go out of my way to get things I want.”
”I crave excitement and new sensations.”

BIS/BAS

Participants were given the full BIS/BAS survey ([17]). The survey consists of 24 four-point
likert scale questions that assess Behavioral Inhibition (BIS) and three variants of Behavioral
Approach (BAS-reward, BAS-fun, BAS-drive). Prototypical examples of items for each
subscale are shown in Table 5.1. An attention check (”When you answer this question,
select somewhat true for me.”) was also included in the middle of the survey in order to
gauge the attention of the participants. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for each subscale
(BIS: 0.77 , BAS Reward Responsiveness: 0.67, BAS Fun Seeking: 0.64 , BAS Drive: 0.72)
in this sample. These values were similar (though lower for BAS Reward Responsiveness)
than the reported alphas from [17] (BIS: 0.74 , BAS Reward Responsiveness: 0.73, BAS Fun
Seeking: 0.66 , BAS Drive: 0.76).

5.2.3

Data Summary

The mean bet/JOL was 5.52(3.26) (5.65(3.59) for the betting framework, and 5.38(2.86)
for the JOL framework). The mean proportion of words recalled is 0.5 (0.51 for the betting
framework, and 0.49 for the JOL framework). Because the task automatically moved on after
10 seconds if a bet/JOL was not given, 334 out of 29,520 trials had missing bets ( 1%), Figure
5.1 shows the distribution of missing bets across each trial as well as the frequency of total
missing bets per participant. This indicates that in general, participants were completing
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the task in a satisfactory manner, though in the first round, participants may have been
acclimating to the task.

Figure 5.1: The top graph (Missing Bets Across Trials) shows at which trials the missing bets/JOLs occured. Gray dashed lines represent the beginning of each round. Most
bets/JOLs were missed in the first round of the MM task, which suggest that participants
are likely still getting used to the structure of the task. The bottom graph (Frequency of
Missing Bets) shows how many bets participants missed in total, out of 60 trials. Most (280)
participants missed no bets, while nearly all (496) missed fewer than 6 bets/JOLs. The gray
dashed line represents the cuto↵ for exclusion. Five participants were excluded for missing
more than 10% of bets/JOLs.

5.3
5.3.1

Results
Scale Usage (Bets/JOLs)

In order to test whether there were di↵erences in bet/JOL scale usage between the conditions,
a mixed e↵ect ordinal regression model (cumulative logistic model) was fit with bet/JOL (010) as the outcome and Framework (bet vs. JOL), order of word within round (1-12),
round (1-5), BIS score, BAS drive, BAS Reward, Bas Fun and the two way interaction
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between BIS and the three BAS factors each with JOL were included. Random intercepts
for individual were also included. Prior distributions for categorical e↵ect were normal
distributions centered around 0 with a standard deviation of 1. Prior distributions for
continuous e↵ects were normal distributions centered around 0 with a standard deviation of
0.3. Convergence was assumed when all R-hat values were less than 1.05, and the Bulk ESS
was 400. Models started with 2,000 iterations, and iterations were increased if R-hat 1.05
but Bulk ESS was too low.

Figure 5.2: The top graph (Bar chart showing the frequency of bets/JOLs for all items (far
left, gray transparent box ), as well as for items separated by order presented (1-12) within
each round. For all items, and for each item order, a frequency bar for each possible bet/JOL
(0-10 from left/purple to right/yellow) is shown. Data from the Betting Framework is shown
on the top, and data from the JOL Framework is shown on the bottom.

In addition, plots of average bets for the two conditions (Figure 5.5), a bar plot of the
variance of bets within each condition (Figure 5.3), and a bar plot displaying the frequency of
bets/JOLs between the two conditions (Figure 5.2) were also created and analyzed. Summary
statistics for each group’s bets/JOLs can be found in Table 5.2. While the average bet/JOLs
are not meaningfully di↵erent between the two Frameworks, Figure 5.2 shows a di↵erence in
how often the extremes of the scales are used. Namely, participants in the Bet Framework
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are much more likely to use 0’s and 10’s (as well as 5’s to a lesser degree) compared to those
in the JOL Framework, who favor the middle range of the scales. Similarly, you can see the
di↵erence in scale usage in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.2, which show the variance in bets/JOLs
between the two Frameworks across rounds. Participants in the JOL Framework consistently
have less variance in their bets/JOLs compared to participants in the Bet Framework.
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics for Bet/JOLs for each Framework.
Bet
JOL

N Bet/JOL
15120 5.59 (3.62)
14400 5.32 (2.9)

BIS
BAS Drive BAS Reward BAS Fun
0.04 (1)
0.01 (1.02) 0.04 (0.95)
-0.04 (0.99)
-0.01 (0.99) 0 (0.99)
-0.01 (1.03)
0.06 (1.02)

Figure 5.3: Bar chart showing the variance of bets/JOLs for the Betting and JOL Frameworks. Variance is shown for each item order (1-12) within round.

Main E↵ect of Framework

While the posterior distribution and 89% credible interval for the e↵ect of Framework suggest
a small, negative e↵ect of being in the JOL Framework condition, the results are inconclusive
as the 89% credible interval overlaps with 0 (-0.16 [-0.38,0.05]). This suggests that participants in the JOL Framework may on average bet slightly lower than their Bet Framework
100

Figure 5.4: Posterior distributions for Bet/JOL model e↵ects (cumulative logistic model).
Parameters are modeled as their e↵ect on the underlying latent score, and cuto↵s are used
to discretize the latent score into an ordinal scale. Light blue areas of posterior distributions
show the 89% credible interval. There is an 89% chance that the true population parameter
will fall somewhere in that region. The dark blue lines in the center of each posterior show
the parameter estimate, and the light gray vertical strip shows e↵ects that are within 0.17
units of 0 (i.e. e↵ects that are very small; the latent distribution assumed by the model is a
logistic distribution, so an e↵ect of 0.17 is roughly comparable to a 0.1 standard deviation
e↵ect in a normal distribution).
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counterparts, but the e↵ect may be small or even zero. However, in Figure 5.4 we can see
that while the average bet/JOL may not be di↵erent, there is a clear and consistent di↵erence in both the variance and the way bets/JOLs are used. Bets of 0 and 10 are much more
likely to appear in the Bet Framework than the JOL Framework.

Main E↵ects of BIS/BAS

The e↵ects of BIS and BAS Drive are both inconclusive as the 89% credible intervals for
both e↵ects overlap with 0 as well as with small e↵ects slightly outside the region of practical
equivalence (BIS: -0.09 [-0.22,0.05]; BAS Drive: 0.08 [-0.07,0.24]). This indicates that the
e↵ects are likely to be very small, but could be big enough to be practically relevant, therefore
more data is needed in order to make stronger conclusions. However, it is reasonable to
conclude that the e↵ect of BIS and BAS Drive is either small, or practically equivalent to
zero, suggesting that it does not have a large impact on bet/JOL overall. However, BAS
Reward and BAS Fun were both notably di↵erent from 0, indicating that higher scores in
BAS Reward and BAS Fun were associated with slightly higher average bets (BAS Reward:
0.17 [0.01,0.33], BAS Fun: 0.16 [0.01,0.31]) .

Main E↵ect of Round

Surprisingly, the e↵ect of round was inconclusive, with the e↵ects of all rounds (2-5) having wide posterior distributions whose 89% credible intervals include 0 (Round 2: 0.17
[-0.16,0.51]; Round 3: -0.03 [-0.36,0.31]; Round 4: -0.11 [-0.44,0.23]; Round 5: -0.29 [0.62,0.05]). This suggests that the overall e↵ect of round has a lot of variability and may
require more data in order to make a strong conclusion. However, there are interaction effects between round and Framework (discussed below), which may explain why the overall
e↵ect is so variable.
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Interaction E↵ects between BIS/BAS and Framework

The interactions between BIS and the three BAS subscales were all small, but inconclusive
(JOL:BIS -0.11 [-0.31,0.09]; JOL:BAS Drive 0.04 [-0.19,0.24]; JOL:BAS Fun -0.16 [-0.37,0.04];
JOL:BAS Reward -0.1 [-0.31,0.12]). This does not support our original hypothesis that the
e↵ect of BIS and the three BAS subscales would be clearly di↵erent between the bet and
JOL Frameworks, rather it suggests that the e↵ect of BIS and BAS are similar between the
two Frameworks.

Interaction E↵ects between Round and Framework

The interaction between round and Framework was notable and practically significant. None
of the 89% credible intervals for the round by Framework interactions contain 0 and have
their posterior means outside the region of practical equivalence (Round 2: -0.23 [-0.33,0.13]; Round 3: -0.23 [-0.33,-0.13]; Round 4: -0.22 [-0.32,-0.11], Round 5: -0.12 [-0.22,-0.02]).
This suggests that the change in bet/JOL usage was di↵erent for participants in the Bet
Framework compared to those in the JOL Framework. This can be seen more clearly in
Figure 5.5.

Di↵erences in Proportions of Bets/JOLs

The above cumulative logistic model tests whether Framework (JOL or Bet) is associated
with higher latent scale values (and therefore higher bets/JOLs), however as seen in Figure
5.2, one of the clearest di↵erences between the two frameworks is that participants in the Bet
Framework tend to use the extremes of the scale–0’s and 10’s– at a much higher rate than
participants in the JOL Framework, who use the each item in the scale more evenly. To assess
whether these di↵erences were notable, a Bayesian multinomial-dirichlet model was run in
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Figure 5.5: A line graph showing the average bet/JOL across rounds between the two Frameworks (Bet vs. JOL).

Stan to test whether the di↵erences in proportions between the two Frameworks were equal
to 0 (this is similar to a Fisher’s Exact Test or a Chi-Square test of independence). Because
there is little previous information about di↵erences between scale usage for ordinal scales
between these Frameworks, a non-informative Dirichlet(1) prior was used for the simplices
containing the probabilities of each possible bet/JOL response (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) for the
two Frameworks.
For each bet/JOL (0-10), the di↵erence between the proportion of trials that Bet Framework
participants used that bet/JOL and the proportion of trials that JOL Framework participants
used that bet/JOL is notably di↵erent from zero, with none of the 89% credible intervals
overlapping with 0. Participants in the Bet Framework tended to use 0, 1 and 10 significantly
more often than participants in the JOL Framework. Whereas participants in the Bet
Framework tended to use 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9 significantly less than participants in the JOL
Framework. Taken together, these results show that there are clear di↵erences in the way
participants in the two Framework conditions use the bet/JOL scales, and that di↵erences
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Figure 5.6: The cumulative logistic model assumes an underlying latent distribution of
bets/JOLs and estimates cuto↵ points above which a person will select each successive
bet/JOL. For example, the yellow shaded region on the far right of the graph represents
all latent values for which the predicted bet/JOL is 10. Similarly, the light green area
immediately to the right of that represents the latent values for which the predicted bet/JOL
is 9. The e↵ects of interest (such as Framework, BIS/BAS...etc) are modeled as a↵ecting
this latent value. The dashed box near zero shows the width smallest e↵ect size of interest
(SESOI; in other words, e↵ects that are so small, we do not believe they are of practical
relevance)

are largest at the extremes of the scale.

5.3.2

Calibration (brier and mBrier)

In order to infer whether there were di↵erences in calibration (separate models were run for
Brier scores, and mBrier scores which adjust for scale usage [67]) between the two conditions
(and whether that relationship was moderated by BIS/BAS), a mixed e↵ect zero-one-inflated
beta regression model was fit using brier scores as the outcome (0-1, 0 being perfect prediction of future performance) and Framework (bet vs. JOL), order of word within round
(1-12), round (1-5), BIS score, BAS drive, BAS Reward, BAS Fun and the two way inter105

Figure 5.7: Posterior Distributions for test of the di↵erences between proportions between
the two Frameworks (Bet vs. JOL). Light blue areas of posterior distributions show the
89% credible interval. There is an 89% chance that the true population parameter will fall
somewhere in that region. The dark blue lines in the center of each posterior show the
parameter estimate. Values to the right of 0 (indicated by the dashed blue line) indicate
that participants in the Bet Framework had a higher proportion of responses in that category
(0-10) than participants in the JOL Framework. Values to the left of 0 indicate the opposite
(JOL proportion > Bet Proportion).
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action between BIS, the three BAS factors and round (1-5) each with JOL were included.
Random intercepts for individual and word were also included. Prior distributions for categorical e↵ect were normal distributions centered around 0 with a standard deviation of 1.
Prior distributions for continuous e↵ects were normal distributions centered around 0 with
a standard deviation of 0.3. Convergence was assumed when all R-hat values were less than
1.05, and the Bulk ESS was 400. Models started with 2,000 iterations, and iterations were
increased if R-hat 1.05 but Bulk ESS was too low. A similar model using the modified
brier scores (mBrier) created in [67] as the outcome was also performed. mBrier scores are
similar to brier scores but use the rank (excluding and preserving 0’s) of bets/JOLs rather
than their raw values. Because evidence suggests that participants may view bets/JOLs as
ordinal rather than as pure probabilities (supporting the confidence rather than probability
interpretation of the anchoring hypothesis [42]), mBrier may be an appropriate way to adjust
for di↵ering scale usage between participants.

mBrier Model

Framework Main E↵ect The e↵ect of framework is inconclusive. The posterior distribution is centered around small, negative values, but its density is spread out and includes
values ranging from moderate negative e↵ects, to small positive e↵ects (and fully contains
the region of practical equivalence; -0.02 [-0.07,0.03]). BIS/BAS Main E↵ects. The mBrier
score model shows no e↵ects of BIS, or any of the three BAS subscales. Not only are the
posterior distributions all centered around 0, but most if not all of each 89% credible intervals is contained within the region of practical equivalence (within 0.1 standard deviation of
0), indicating that it is very likely that these main e↵ects are practically equivalent to zero
(BIS: 0.02 [-0.01,0.04]; BAS Drive: 0.01 [-0.02,0.03]; BAS Reward: 0 [-0.02,0.03]; BAS Fun:
0 [-0.02,0.02])
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Figure 5.8: Posterior distributions for mBrier model e↵ects (zero-one inflated beta regression). Light blue areas of posterior distributions show the 89% credible interval. There is
an 89% chance that the true population parameter will fall somewhere in that region. The
dark blue lines in the center of each posterior show the parameter estimate, and the light
gray vertical strip shows e↵ects that are within 0.1 standard deviation of 0 (in other words,
e↵ects that are very small).

Round Main E↵ects The 89% credible intervals for the e↵ect of round were largely
inconclusive and contain both 0 and negative e↵ects (Round 2: -0.06 [-0.13,0.02]; Round 3:
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-0.07 [-0.15,0]; Round 4: -0.06 [-0.14,0.02]; Round 5: -0.1 [-0.18,-0.02]) showing that while
mBrier scores tended to go down across time, it is possible these e↵ects are small or 0.

Round by Framework Interactions The 89% credible intervals for the round by framework interactions were largely inconclusive and contain both 0 and positive e↵ects (Round
2: 0.06 [-0.01,0.13]; Round 4: 0.04 [-0.03,0.11]; Round 5: 0.06 [-0.02,0.13]) except for the
JOL:round 3 interaction which suggests that for participants in the JOL Framework condition, the predicted round 3 mBrier scores are slightly higher than expected based on the
main e↵ects of Framework and round 3 alone (0.07 [0,0.14]). These results suggest that participants in the JOL Framework group may have slightly higher (i.e. worse) mBrier scores
in later rounds than expected. However the posterior distributions show that these e↵ects
may be small, if not near zero.

BIS/BAS by Framework Interactions The interactions between the four BIS/BAS
measures and Framework were all inconclusive with their posterior distributions and 89%
credible intervals including 0 as well as small e↵ects in either direction (BIS: -0.01 [-0.04,0.02];
BAS Drive: 0.03 [-0.01,0.06]; BAS Reward: -0.02 [-0.05,0.02]; BAS Fun: 0 [-0.03,0.03] ).

Brier Model

Framework Main E↵ect The e↵ect of framework is inconclusive. While the posterior
distribution is centered near zero, and has most of its density within the region of practical
equivalence (0.02 [-0.04,0.07]]), the 89% credible interval does contain values outside the
region of practical equivalence.

BIS/BAS Main E↵ects The brier score model shows that there is likely no notable e↵ect
of BIS or BAS Fun. While the 89% credible intervals do contain values outside the region of
109

Figure 5.9: Posterior distributions for Brier model e↵ects (zero-one inflated beta regression).
Light blue areas of posterior distributions show the 89% credible interval. There is an 89%
chance that the true population parameter will fall somewhere in that region. The dark blue
lines in the center of each posterior show the parameter estimate, and the light gray vertical
strip shows region of practical equivalence (i.e. e↵ects that are within 0.1 standard deviation
of 0, e↵ects that are very small).

practical equivalence defined by -0.1*sd to 0.1*sd (indicated by the gray region of Figure 5.9),
almost all of both credible intervals are contained within the region of practical equivalence
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(BIS: 0 [-0.03,0.03]; BAS Fun: 0 [-0.03,0.04]). There are, however, notable e↵ects of BAS
Drive and BAS Reward with higher BAS Drive being associated with lower brier scores, and
higher BAS Reward being associated with higher brier scores (BAS Drive: -0.04 [-0.07,0];
BAS Reward: 0.05 [0.01,0.09]). For both of these main e↵ects, the 89% credible intervals do
not overlap with 0, indicating that it is unlikely that there is no e↵ect.

Round Main E↵ects There were notable e↵ects of round, with rounds 2, 3, 4 and 5
having notably di↵erent brier scores than round 1 (Round 2: -0.12 [-0.18,-0.07]; Round 3:
-0.16 [-0.21,-0.1]; Round 4: -0.18 [-0.24,-0.13]; Round 5: -0.24 [-0.29,-0.18]). In general,
brier scores went down (which reflects better calibration) across rounds, suggesting that
participants got better at calibrating their bets/JOLs over time.

Round by Framework Interactions The 89% credible intervals for the round by framework interactions were positive and did not contain 0, indicating that there was a round by
framework interaction (JOL:Round 2 0.07 [0.01,0.14]; JOL:Round 3 0.07 [0,0.14]; JOL:Round
4 0.08 [0.02,0.15]; JOL:Round 5 0.08 [0.01,0.15]). This can be seen more clearly in Figure
5.10 where the lines for the JOL framework (Blue) and Bet Framework (Pink) diverge as the
rounds progress. This suggests that participants in the Bet Framework condition improved
their calibration more across time (for brier scores, lower is better).

BIS/BAS by Framework Interactions The interactions between BIS and framework
and BAS Fun and framework were both inconclusive (JOL: BIS 0 [-0.04,0.05]; JOL:BAS
Fun -0.03 [-0.08,0.01]) as they overlapped both with 0, and with e↵ects outside the region of
practical equivalence (shown in gray in Figure 5.9). However, the interaction e↵ects between
BAS Reward and framework, as well as BAS Drive and framework were notably di↵erent
than zero with the 89% credible intervals for both posterior distributions not overlapping
with zero (JOL:BAS Reward -0.07 [-0.12,-0.03]; JOL: BAS Drive 0.06 [0.01,0.11] ). For
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Figure 5.10: Line graphs showing the mean Brier (top) and mBrier (bottom) scores across
the MM task. The Betting Framework condition is shown in pink, and the JOL Framework
condition is shown in blue. Averages across both Frameworks shown by the gray dotted line.

those in the JOL Framework condition, high BAS Drive scores were associated with lower
brier scores than expected based on the main e↵ects of JOL Framework and BAS Drive
alone. Conversely, for those in the JOL Framework condition, high BAS Reward scores
were associated with higher brier scores than expected based on the main e↵ects of JOL
Framework and BAS Reward alone.

5.3.3

Accuracy

In order to assess whether the conditions (Betting Framework vs. JOL Framework) had
di↵erences in overall recall accuracy and whether BIS/BAS moderated that relationship
a mixed e↵ect logistic regression model was performed using accuracy (0-not recalled, 1recalled) for each trial as the outcome and Framework (bet vs. JOL), order of word within
round (1-12), round (1-5), BIS score, BAS drive, BAS Reward, Bas Fun and the two way
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Figure 5.11: Interaction plots for the JOL by BIS, BAS Reward, BAS Drive, and BAS Fun
interactions in the Brier score model. The e↵ect of the BIS/BAS scores on Brier scores were
notably di↵erent between the two frameworks.

interaction between BIS and the three BAS factors each with JOL were included. Random
intercepts for individual and word were also included. In addition, plots of mean accuracy
between the conditions across all five rounds were created (see Figure 5.12). Prior distributions for categorical e↵ect were normal distributions centered around 0 with a standard
deviation of 1. Prior distributions for continuous e↵ects were normal distributions centered
around 0 with a standard deviation of 0.3. Convergence was assumed when all R-hat values
were less than 1.05, and the Bulk ESS was 400. Models started with 2,000 iterations, and
iterations were increased if R-hat 1.05 but Bulk ESS was too low.
None of the e↵ects in the model were conclusive. While some of the e↵ects (like the e↵ect of
JOL (-0.14 [-0.29,0.02]), JOL:Round 4 (0.12 [-0.01,0.25]), and bas fun (0.09 [-0.02,0.2])) seem
to have small e↵ects, the 89% CI for all three e↵ects overlaps with zero, indicating that zero
as well as small, potentially clinically unimportant e↵ects are possible. Similarly, none of
the 89% CIs for the e↵ects fit entirely within -0.1*sd-0.1*sd around 0, which would indicate
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Figure 5.12: Mean accuracy/recall for the two conditions across all five rounds.

evidence of no e↵ect. Rather, the posterior distributions are wide and all contain both
small, clinically unimportant e↵ects (including 0) as well as e↵ects that could be practically
meaningful. This suggests that even more data is needed to make stronger conclusions.
There were, however, strong order e↵ects showing both primacy and recency biases (see
Figure 5.14).

5.4

Discussion

One interesting insight from this study is that some of the e↵ects examined may require
quite large sample sizes in order to make conclusive statements about them. Even with
60 observations for 492 participants (509 before exclusions; approaching 30,000 individual
observations), the posterior distributions for many e↵ects were not narrow enough to make
strong conclusions that the e↵ect was either non-zero (89% credible interval does not contain
zero) or that the e↵ects were practically equivalent to zero (where the 89% credible interval
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Figure 5.13: Posterior distributions for accuracy model e↵ects (mixed e↵ect logistic regression). Light blue areas of posterior distributions show the 89% credible interval. There is
an 89% chance that the true population parameter will fall somewhere in that region. The
dark blue lines in the center of each posterior show the parameter estimate, and the light
gray vertical strip shows e↵ects that are within 0.1 standard deviation of 0 (in other words,
e↵ects that are very small).

is contained entirely within the region of practical equivalence). This is likely a result of
high variability in these e↵ects, which suggests that even more data may be needed to make
strong conclusions. This is important to note, because many studies on meta memory have
even fewer participants. It is also helpful to make use of Bayesian models, or at least pair
Frequentist models with equivalence testing like the Two One Sided t-test (TOST) which
can allow researchers to distinguish between e↵ects that are inconclusive, and e↵ects that are
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Figure 5.14: E↵ect of order of item (1-12) on recall. Items at the beginning and end of each
list were most likely to be recalled.

practically equivalent to zero, which is not inherently part of the traditional null hypothesis
significance testing.
Interestingly, our study and analysis demonstrate that the way a MM task is framed can
a↵ect the way participants use a non-binary bet/JOL scale. We found that when the solicited
judgement of learning was framed as a bet rather than an explicit judgement of learning
(”How much would you like to bet?” vs. ”How confident are you that you will remember
this word?”), participants were definitively more likely to use the extremes of the scale
(0,1, and 10). Because of this di↵erence, it is important to consider whether gamifying
an MM task to use a bet will change the metric that a study is aiming to measure. The
ordinal (cumulative logistic) model showed that there may be small di↵erences in the average
bet/JOL between the frameworks (with participants in the Bet Framework having slightly
higher bets), however the di↵erences are likely to be small, if not practically equivalent to
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zero. However, there were clear di↵erences in the variability of bets/JOLs, as well as clear
di↵erences in the proportions of each response (0-10) between the two Frameworks. Taken
together, this demonstrates that the main di↵erences between bet/JOL patterns in the two
groups likely results from the variability induced by the higher proportion of extreme scale
usage in the Bet Framework rather than from large di↵erences in the mean bet/JOL.
In the gamified context presented in the Bet Framework, it does seem more reasonable that
someone would take an all-or-nothing approach. For example, if I felt that I had an 80%
chance of remembering a word, I may bet 10, even though I know there is a slight chance
that I may not recall the word. However, if I were to give an explicit judgement of how likely
I was to remember the word, I may be more accurate and report that there is less than 100%
chance.
In relation to the anchoring hypothesis, this may suggest that it is important to consider
both what the possible anchor value is (and whether it varies person to person), as well as
how far an individual is willing to drift from their anchor. In this context, our evidence
suggests that while there may not be meaningful di↵erences between the anchor points for
the two Frameworks, there are clearly di↵erences in how often individuals use bet/JOL values
that are far away from their anchor. Another potential explanation is that perhaps with the
betting framework, individuals have di↵erent sets of internal anchors based on preconceived
notions of ”betting.” In many betting scenarios, a player makes a binary decision (i.e., you
bet on a team or not; you fold or not in a poker game), and this binary decision heuristic
may have been reflected in our participants’ use of the extreme values (0, 1, and 10) in the
betting framework. That is, when they are fairly confident even if not completely confident,
the high internal anchor would pull them to the 10; when they are rather uncertain even if
not completely un-confident, the low anchor would pull their bet values down to 0 or 1. The
existence of the third mode around the medium suggests a third anchor, one that is more
related to participants’ internal estimate of their performance and similar to what we saw in
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the JOL framework, when an individual is truly unsure. Future work could investigate the
potential existence of multiple anchors versus the likelihood of individuals deviating from
their anchor. Regardless of the explanation, it is clear that scale usage di↵ered by framing
the task one way versus another.
In contrast to our findings with the bet/JOL value placement, we did not find clear evidence that there are practically meaningful di↵erences in participants’ calibration in the
two frameworks, nor was there clear e↵ects of a di↵erence in accuracy. While the results
were still inconclusive due to wide posterior distributions, it is at the very least evident that
there are not strong, clear e↵ects mirroring the ones seen in the usage of the bet/JOL scale,
suggesting that the e↵ect of this di↵ering scale usage is not causing a clear and precise e↵ect
on participants’ calibration. This lack of di↵erence could be potentially explained by participants being equally good at making metacognitive judgments or at strategizing to maximize
their performance. Calibration is, again, how closely matched the bet/JOL is with accuracy.
High calibration means that the higher the participants’ bet/JOL value for a word, the more
accurate they are in remembering that word. There are ways to achieve a high performance
in our task. For example, participants could choose to remember the words they placed
high bet/JOL in and decide to neglect the words to which they assigned low ratings. The
strategies that can be used do not di↵er between the frameworks. It is therefore conceivable that we see no clear evidence of any e↵ect of framework on participants’ calibration.
However, because this study did not qualitatively interview participants on their strategy
use, we cannot definitively state whether potential strategy use is a contributing factor to
the similar calibration performance. Future research on metamemory control can consider
soliciting participants’ strategies or recommending/manipulating strategies for participants
to consider.
Despite inconclusive evidence of di↵erences in accuracy or calibration by framework, there
are clear di↵erences in the e↵ect of BAS Reward and BAS Drive scales on Brier scores
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(used for calibration). For those in the Betting Framework, BAS Drive and BAS Reward
both had non zero e↵ects, with higher BAS Reward scores being associated with worse
Brier scores (higher scores are worse, and indicate poor match between judgement of future
recall and actual recall) and higher BAS Drive scores being associated with better Brier
scores. However, these relationships are more or less flat for those in the JOL Framework.
This indicates that participants may be approaching the task (specifically the JOLs and
Bets since we did not observe clear di↵erences in accuracy) di↵erently. When the JOLs are
instead framed as placing a bet, it may encourage participants to see their response as risky,
rather than just a judgement. If participants view their responses as having some level of
risk, it seems fitting that BAS Reward (which measures one experiences positive responses to
rewards [98]) and BAS Drive (which measures how persistent one is in pursuing desired goals
[98]) could have more of an e↵ect. For example, having more positive responses to rewards
(and in anticipation of reward) may make a participant more likely to bet high in search of
the positive reward of gaining points, but without a commensurate increase in recall accuracy
compared to someone with low BAS Reward, this would lead to higher (worse) Brier scores,
as shown by our results. However, because in the JOL Framework, JOLs are not framed as
something that will be rewarded, it does not have a similar e↵ect. This is also supported
by the positive e↵ect of BAS Reward on bets in both Frameworks (with high BAS Reward
scores being associated with higher bets/JOLs), but there was not an accompanying clear,
strong e↵ect of BAS Reward on accuracy. Together, these e↵ects explain why worse (higher)
Brier scores were observed for those with high BAS Reward scores.
This e↵ect was not, however, observed in analysis of mBrier scores which normalize scale
usage by ranking non-zero bets, thus adjusting for whether participants were using the
extremes of the scale. Rather, the e↵ect of BAS Reward on mBrier scores is practically
equivalent to zero. This suggests that the e↵ect on Brier scores observed may be driven by
how often extreme bets/JOLs are used, again supporting the idea that both the anchor point
as well as variance around the anchor point should be examined in many cases, especially
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when considering individual di↵erences in said measurements rather than only examining
them on a group level.
Similarly, having more persistence in pursuing goals (measured by BAS Drive) seems to have
a positive e↵ect (again lower is better) on Brier Scores for those in the Bet Framework, but
has little to no e↵ect on Brier scores of those in the JOL Framework. This may be because
in the Bet Framework there is a clearer, more attractive goal: get a high score. Whereas in
the JOL Framework, the goal is less clear: be accurate in your ratings. Because those in the
JOL Framework are not told how the score the are shown at the end of each round (though
calculated in the same way as for those in the Bet Framework) is calculated, they also may
not see the direct connection between their responses and whether they are meeting their
goal, whereas those in the Bet Framework largely can.
The current study was limited by the sample size, which although larger than many similar
metamemory studies, was not large enough to estimate many of the e↵ects with enough precision to make conclusive statements about the e↵ects. Future work should focus on increasing
the sample size further to see whether that can increase the precision of model estimates.
Additionally, given that the main di↵erences in scale usage between the Frameworks had to
do with variance and not the overall bet/JOL, the di↵erences-in-proportions model used to
look at the di↵erence in proportions (Bet vs. JOL Framework) for each bet/JOL response
can be extended so that the estimated proportions are not only modeled by Framework,
but also by continuous covariates such as the BIS/BAS subscales. Furthermore, the current
study used an ordinal bet/JOL scale, but more fine grained (e.g. allowing percentages 0100, or even a continuous slider between 0-100) scales should also be used to see whether the
observed e↵ects still exist (and whether they may even be stronger when JOLs are framed
explicitly as percentages).
This work provides clear evidence that the way in which a JOL is elicited (in this case as
a bet vs. an explicit judgement of learning) does have an e↵ect on how participants utilize
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an ordinal (0-10) scale. Interestingly, the major di↵erences between groups seem to be in
the spread and variance of scale usage rather than the mean bet/JOL. This suggests that
when a JOL is elicited as a bet, participants are more likely to use the extreme ends of the
scale. In the context of the anchoring hypothesis, this suggests that people asked for a bet
rather than an explicit JOL may stray further away from their anchor value resulting in
larger variations in bet/JOL on an ordinal scale, but no large, notable di↵erences in average
bet/JOL. This may be a result of a change in the heuristics used by participants when JOLs
are framed as bets. For example, ”going all in” (betting the maximum value) is a common
saying in gambling, and framing the JOL as a bet on an ordinal scale may make that context
more salient. Relatedly, our brier but not our mBrier model showed e↵ects of BAS Reward
Responsiveness and BAS Drive as well as interactions between Framework (bet vs. JOL)
and BAS Reward Responsiveness and BAS Drive. This suggests that when you adjust JOLs
by using ranks rather than raw scores (see [67]), e↵ects of BAS Reward Responsiveness and
BAS Drive and their interaction with framework are reduced, indicating that these two BAS
components and framework may influence the variability of bets/JOLs more than actual
resolution. All in all, these e↵ects provide justification that researchers should carefully
consider the context and framework in which they elicit JOLs if variation around an anchor
point is important, because participants may use scales di↵erently depending on how the
JOL is elicited.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In conclusion, this dissertation has presented multiple examples of how researchers using
cognitive measures can take advantage of the trial-level data provided by many cognitive
measures (such as the BART, CRUM, and MM tasks) to perform more fine-grained analyses
of their data.
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that clustering participants based on their performance across
all trials (rather than relying on sums or averages of scores within participant) is able to
identify broad strategy clusters that describe how participants use an ordinal (0-10) betting
scale in a metamemory task. On cluster in particular showed an interesting pattern in
which participants bet high on items early in each list and very low on items later in each
list. This cyclical pattern was quite strong and used relatively equally between young and
older adults. The betting nature of this task in which participants not only gain points
for recalling words they bet on but also lose points if they bet on words and do not recall
them suggests an optimal strategy in which participants go ”all in” on a handful of words
(however many they can remember), and bet 0 on all other words. In order to gain rehearsal
time and take advantage of the primacy e↵ect (which I repeatedly demonstrated throughout
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this dissertation), remembering earlier words could be strategic. This is exactly the strategy
employed by the cyclical cluster in Chapter 2. Betting strategies in MM tasks can be useful
in understanding di↵erent ways that participants approach the task, and even give insight
into whether the betting framework for eliciting JOLs is accomplishing a similar goal as
directly asking for a judgement of learning. Clustering allows researchers to look at patterns
and trends across all trials and can give more insight into participant performance compared
to an averaged metric across time. As seen in Chapter 5, framing a JOL as a ”bet” increases
the use of extreme values (0,1) in an ordinal JOL scale. This increase in variability would
likely be missed by a pure average over all trials within participant, but can be detected with
trial-level analyses such as clustering using each individual trial for each participant.
Similarly, my cluster analysis of mBrier scores across five rounds showed distinct patterns
in participants’ scaled calibration or ”match”. While average calibration (or scaled calibration) is often of interest, we may also want to detect similar patterns in calibration over
time. Again, clustering allows for these patterns to be detected. In fact, in my 3-cluster
analysis of mBrier scores in Chapter 2, we showed three interesting pattern. First, there was
a cluster with low (good) mBrier scores that were relatively stable across rounds, indicating
that these participants started out with good mBrier scores and maintained them across the
entire task. Second, there was a cluster of similarly stable but high (poor) mBrier scores,
indicating that these participants largely did not improve over time. Finally, there was a
cluster with highly variable mBrier scores that peaked in rounds 1 and 3 and got better
(lower) in the final two rounds, suggesting that these participants may have been able to
better calibrate or ”match” their JOLs to their actual performance as time went on. Interestingly, there were strong age related di↵erences between the clusters with young adults
predominantly in the first cluster, and with older adults making up almost the entirety of the
second. This demonstrates that older adults do tend to have not only worse recall, but also
worse calibration/match (as measured by mBrier). We did not, however, observe significant
di↵erences in the betting/JOL strategies used by older and young adults, suggesting that an
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e↵ective way of improving calibration/match in older adults is to teach them, or encourage
them to use strategies that are better suited for their level of recall ability. However, using
cluster analyses, researchers and clinicians alike can target interventions (like the one mentioned) specifically to older adults who are most likely to benefit. These strategy clusters
can also be used to examine the prevalence of di↵erent strategies across multiple individual
characteristics (such as age, as explored in Chapter 2, or cognitive ability, working memory,
risk propensity...etc).
In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that IRT models are a useful tool for estimating factor
scores for latent traits in cognitive measures such as MM tasks. When unweighted sums and
averages are taken, the researcher is implicitly assuming that the weights for each item are
equivalent. However, this may not be the case, and in fact there are theoretical as well as
pragmatic reasons why we might expect that the weights should be di↵erent. For example,
participants may need to get used to the structure and format of a task before they are
equipped to demonstrate their true latent ability, there also may be certain trials (especially
in cognitive measures where the items are di↵erent on each trial, such as in MM tasks) in
which discrimination is poor due to item level characteristics (for example, in the MM task
the valence, or even imageability of a word may have an e↵ect on how well an item is able to
discriminate between participants with di↵erent latent trait scores). In my examination of
MM task data from 492 participants, I demonstrated that discrimination in the first round
of the MM task was notably lower than in later rounds (particularly the fifth, final round),
indicating that these earlier items are not discriminating between participants as well as later
items, and therefore may not give researchers as much clear insight into latent calibration
(as measured by item-level brier scores) as later items. While di↵erences in discrimination
may be di↵erent for di↵erent tasks, and may depend on the context of the task (including
the context in which JOLs are elicited), using IRT models in order to estimate whether equal
weighting is appropriate should be considered rather than assuming equal weights without
evidence.
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Factor scores representing latent recall ability, as well as difficulty scores for each item
in a MM task may also provide insight into when and for whom certain e↵ects (such as
UWP) apply. For example: does UWP occur equally for difficult vs. easy items? Are
people with high latent recall ability more likely to improve their calibration over time?
Getting (potentially) more accurate estimates of latent recall ability (compared to raw,
unweighted scores) may help tease apart more subtle di↵erences. It has been demonstrated
in multiple MM datasets that there are both primacy and recency e↵ects on recall (though
primacy e↵ects may be stronger in some samples as seen in Chapter 3), which may e↵ect the
discrimination of both early and late items. For example, if almost everyone recalls the first
item in a list of 12, recalling that item may be less indicative of strong latent recall skills as
recalling the seventh item in a list of 12.
I also discussed ZOIDBERG models in Chapter 3, and discussed the benefit of using them
both alone (to model continuous, bounded scores such as brier scores) in item-level analyses
as well as in conjunction with IRT style predictors (e.g. with a 2pl framework in which
discrimination and difficulty are estimated for each item, as well as latent trait scores).
Brier scores are a particularly good use case for ZOIDBERG models because brier scores
of exactly 0 and 1 are common and occur far more often than many typical distribution
(e.g. normal, beta...) would suggest. Brier scores of exactly 0 are also of particular interest
to many researchers because they are instances of perfect metamemory calibration/match
which is desirable. Due to their mixture components, ZOIDBERG models–compared to
beta regression or linear probability models–allow for separate estimation of the proportion of
exact 0’s and 1’s, allowing researchers to separately draw inferences about these special cases.
Future work can also look at how individual or item level characteristics a↵ect the proportions
of 0’s, 1’s, and 0-1s (non-inclusive). Because item-level analyses will naturally have more
variation in scores than participant-level analyses (due to the fact that sums/averages are
squeezed toward the mean in any population with finite variance), models like ZOIDBERG
that explicitly bound possible predictions are important so that impossible predictions (such
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as values outside [0,1] in the case of brier scores) are removed. These IRT-like models that
use beta distributed errors of the 0-1 component and include separate density for exact 0’s
and 1’s can help researches model scores such as brier scores more accurately, and check
whether di↵erential weighting of items is appropriate in that sample.
In Chapter 4 I apply some of the models discussed in Chapter 3 to a Child Risk Utility
Measure (CRUM) dataset given to fifty-nine preschool-aged children. The CRUM task (and
similar versions such as the BART) is often scored with an unweighted, set-level metric, but
futher insight can be gleaned from an individual item-level analysis. Our analysis showed
that there were notable e↵ects of working memory performance, and inhibitory control on
whether or not a child successfully completed a CRUM trial. Success in a CRUM trial
means that a child stopped the trial and collected their reward before they lost their reward
(probability of losing their reward increased on every successive action within the trial).
Working memory span was negatively associated with a successful trial, which may be due
to children with poorer working memory avoiding taking risks, and therefore ending their
trials early with a small reward, but less risk of losing their reward. Inhibitory control was
positively associated with a successful trial, likely due to the fact that inhibitory control
is needed to stop a trial rather than continuing. I also showed that there is noticeable
individual variability between participants (shown by the latent trait scores generated by
the IRT model), indicating that there are individual di↵erences in the way that preschoolaged children take risks. While current studies often look at the way risk taking changes
across age groups, fewer look at variability within age groups.
In Chapter 5 I used Bayesian regression models (including logistic regression, cumulative
logit regression, and zero-one-inflated-beta regression) in order to asses whether the context
in which a judgement of learning is elicited e↵ects participants’ use of an ordinal (0-10)
scale, their accuracy of recall, or their calibration (brier score). In addition, I used the
four BIS/BAS sub-scales to assess whether Behavioral Inhibition and Approach/Avoidance
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moderated the relationship between the JOL framework/context and ordinal scale usage.
The results showed a few interesting results. First, many of the posterior distributions for
the various regression models looking at mean scale usage, accuracy, and calibration were
quite wide, covering both near-zero and potentially relevant e↵ect sizes. This indicates that
the variability in these e↵ect may be high, causing large uncertainty around mean estimates,
and therefore more data or better, more principled priors based on established expertise
are needed. This is especially interesting because despite the wide posteriors, the current
study looks at a relatively large sample (492 participants, 60 trials each) compared to many
metamemory studies, and might suggest that larger sample sizes may be needed for many of
the e↵ects of interest in metamemory research. In addition, when using Bayesian methods,
our results suggest that more precise priors that line up with expertise in the fields may help
increase the precision of the posteriors, leading to more conclusive results.
In the case of analyses on bets/JOLs, much of this variability may be a result of di↵erences in
how far participants are willing to stray from their respective anchor points. Our cumulative
logit model, which assumes a latent bet variable that is predicted by our various features
(such as BIS/BAS, JOL framework...etc) and estimates cuto↵s that result in the discrete
options (0-10) that we observe. Because of this structure, our e↵ect estimates are looking
at di↵erences in the average bet/JOL, many of which are small or inconclusive. However,
a multinomial-Dirichlet model showed that there are clear item by item di↵erences in how
often participants selected each response in the scale (0-10). Participants who were asked
to bet on how likely they were to remember a word were significantly more likely to use
responses on the extreme ends of the scales. Bets of 10, 0, and 1 were all much more
likely for participants asked to bet rather than provide an explicit JOL, whereas responses
in the mid-range of the scale were slightly more likely for those asked to provide a JOL.
The framing of a JOL as a bet may make certain heuristics (such as going ”all in” which
is common in gambling) more salient to participants, resulting in more reliance on these
heuristics which further result in di↵erences in scale usage. In combination with the small,
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inconclusive e↵ects seen on the mean bet/JOL between frameworks, these results suggest
that di↵erences in metamemory performance may lie more in the variation of bets/JOLs
used rather than di↵erences in the mean bet/JOL. The types of trial-level analyses used in
this dissertation are particularly useful to capture these di↵erences, as averaging bets/JOLs
across sets can obfuscate these di↵erences. Further extensions of the multinomial-Dirichlet
model to include item and person-level e↵ects may be able to provide further insight into
the e↵ect of continuous variables on bets/JOLs.
I also observed notably non-zero e↵ects of BAS Drive and BAS Reward on calibration (as
measured by brier scores), suggesting that higher BAS Reward scores are associated with
worse brier scores (higher scores are worse, and indicate poor match between judgement
of future recall and actual future recall) and higher BAS Drive scores are associated with
better brier scores. However, these relationships are more or less flat for those in the JOL
Framework, shown by the opposite direction interaction e↵ects between framework and the
two BAS sub-scales. This indicates that participants may be approaching the task (specifically the JOLs and Bets as we did not observe clear di↵erences in accuracy) di↵erently.
When the JOLs are instead framed as placing a bet, it may encourage participants to see
their response as risky, rather than just a judgement. If participants view their responses
as being potentially risky, their levels of Reward Responsiveness and Drive may kick in,
whereas in a typical JOL context, it may not due to a lack of perceived potential risk. These
di↵erences are important for researchers to consider when choosing how to implement MM
tasks, especially if they are interested in potential variability of scale usage between groups.
Interestingly, these e↵ects were not observed on mBrier scores which use ranking to re-scale
bet/JOL usage within participant. This suggests that mBrier scores may be an e↵ective way
to account for di↵erences in variability around anchor points between participants. While
framing JOLs as a bet may help the task be more engaging or understandable, it also may
a↵ect the way participants understand, contextualize, and perform on the task.
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In general, the models in Chapter 5 provide evidence that trial-level analyses can provide
useful insight into participants behavior on metamemory tasks, and demonstrate specifically
that variability of JOLs may be just as important to examine as average JOLs when looking
at group di↵erences. The models presented here can be used in a variety of applications, both
in metamemory research, as well as with other cognitive measures (such as those presented
in Chapter 4, as well as things like working memory tasks, and other lab measures) in order
to capitalize on trial-level variability and the insight resulting.
In summary, this dissertation discusses and applies a wide range of models from hierarchical agglomerative clustering, to Bayesian IRT models, to cumulative logit models and
multinomial-dirichlet models and demonstrates the ways in which their novel application
to common cognitive measures can improve the inferences that researchers can make about
their data. Though these models are not necessary in every application, they are useful tools
that can be applied in many situations in order to take advantage of trial-level data, and
should be more commonly applied, especially in cases where it is possible that item or triallevel characteristics may play a moderating role in an e↵ect. Summing or averaging scores
across sets or within participant can hide important variability, as seen in Chapter 5, can
obfuscate patterns across trials as seen in Chapter 2, and can (when unweighted) potentially
miss out on the nuance of estimated latent trait scores as seen in Chapters 3 and 4. The
models presented in this dissertation provide just a glimpse at the di↵erent model structures
that can be leveraged in order to begin to overcome some of the above mentioned concerns,
and leave room for further extensions and other novel applications of these methods.
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Appendices

A

Supplemental Materials

Concreteness
Imagability
A
B
A
B
Valid 60
60
19
60
Mean 4.65
3.59
557.3
441.5
(sd)
(0.52) (0.90) (69.01) (66.18)
Min
1.33
1.7
348
331
Max
5
4.96
643
534

Length
A
B
60
60
4.28
5.02
(0.69) (1.02)
3
4
5
7

Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Wordlist Characteristics.

Arousal
A
B
Valid 60
59
Mean 3.99
3.92
(sd)
(0.92) (0.82)
Min
2.35
1.67
Max
7.24
5.75

Valence
A
B
59
60
6.00
5.52
(0.97) (0.71)
3.63
4.17
7.89
6.95

Log
A
60
4.28
(1.29)
5.27
12.16

Freq
Polysemy
B
A
B
60
25
20
5.02
3.48
5.3
(1.15) (3.24) (4.37)
8.55
1
1
12.72 15
19

Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Wordlist Characteristics.
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Figure A.1: A barplot of the mean mBrier score for each mBrier Cluster (2 clusters), split by
age. This plot shows that which OAs and YAs may still score di↵erentially, similar patterns
emerge between OAs and YAs with cluster 1 having lower mBrier scores, and cluster 2 having
higher mBrier scores for both Age groups.
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Figure A.2: A barplot of the mean mBrier score for each mBrier Cluster (3 clusters), split by
age. This plot shows that which OAs and YAs may still score di↵erentially, similar patterns
emerge between OAs and YAs with cluster 1 having lower mBrier scores, cluster 2 having
higher mBrier scores, and cluster 3 having scores in the middle for both Age groups.
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Figure A.3: A barplot of the mean mBrier score for each Strategy Cluster (2 clusters), split by
age. This plot shows that which OAs and YAs may still score di↵erentially, similar patterns
emerge between OAs and YAs with scores being similar (but slightly lower for cluster 2) for
both Age groups.
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Figure A.4: A barplot of the mean mBrier score for each Strategy Cluster (3 clusters),
split by age. This plot shows that which OAs and YAs may still score di↵erentially, similar
patterns emerge between OAs and YAs with cluster 1 having lower mBrier scores, cluster
2 having midrange mBrier scores, and cluster 3 having higher mBrier scores for both Age
groups.
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